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Abstract 
The complex development of a country’s economic situation with various components 
affecting it in many different ways may lead to important changes as a result of a shift in one 
or more important factors. Allocation of scarce resources is crucial for so many different 
agents in all sorts of markets. Important decisions will have to be made by an individual, a 
firm and a corporation, and this chain of decision making leads all the way up to the central 
government of a country. One of these factors that might seem simple at first, but is indeed 
very wide is the demand for education in a country. In general, the demand for education 
shows not only the quantity of education demanded, but also what kind of human capital is 
being demanded in a labor market by certain firms. 
In this thesis, the demand for education has been estimated by using an existing framework 
that conducts analyses of individual demand through government and private education 
expenditure. The analysis is conducted by using income, defined as real GDP and government 
revenue, and the price of education as the important explanatory variables. Data for income 
and price estimates are collected from both national and international statistics sources, with 
the use of cross-sectional data from 2012 for most of the income variables and time series 
data for price and income variables in the time period of 1997-2012. The main objective of 
this analysis is to estimate income and price effects that can explain the ratio of education 
expenditures to GDP. 
The results does not yield any estimated income or price elasticity that are applicable to 
explain the total education expenditures in Norway for any of the estimation methods using 
the two-step analysis. The same outcome results from a time series regression of total demand 
for high education splitting the analysis into a government and a non-government (private) 
component that is aggregated in the analysis, but it does show evidence for a positive and 
small income elasticity that does result in a small impact on total demand for education. 
Aggregative analysis shows that the income elasticity of 0.238 while the price elasticity is       
-0.121, so in sum the aggregate analysis suggests that education is a normal good. It is not 
possible to explain the education spending to GDP ratio through the government component 
of aggregate demand, but the private component yields an income elasticity of -0.884 and a 
price elasticity of -0.372. This suggests that private education is an inferior good (not a Giffen 
good), but the available data for private education are considered too uncertain to conclude 
this. 
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1. Introduction 
In the dynamic world today with various markets experiencing rapid changes and the need for 
them to adapt to these, areas and sectors needed to adapt are numerous and increasing. 
Everything from strategy, management and marketing to innovation, worker knowledge and 
bundles of product properties are subject to moderation and evaluation due to consumer 
demand and changes in the consumers’ preferences. All of these factors on a superficial level 
lead to several changes at different areas concerning this.  
One of the areas that is affected by these changes is the education sector. Changes both in the 
business cycles and in the optimal ways of running a business in order to be competitive 
affects a country’s focus and policies towards education. Over time, both the supply and 
demand for education have developed together with technological advances, complexity of 
firms and business structure (Cappelen et al., 2013). As the demand for more advanced 
education increases, there is also a need for a higher supply of more educated labor with more 
formal credentials in order to succeed in a competitive market (Lazear & Gibbs, 2009).  
The goal with this research is to determine the demand for education in Norway. The paper 
will be focusing on a demand analysis through the Norwegian government’s education 
spending and the spending from private institutions by using an existing analysis framework 
used to determine the demand for education in China. The paper will consist of a theoretical 
and empirical part analyzing the research questions posed, followed by a discussion regarding 
the results found from the estimations and analyses. The theoretical framework in chapter 3 
and the hypotheses in chapter 5 is aiming to answer the following research questions: 
1) How does changes in income and the price of education impact the education 
expenditures in Norway? 
2) Are there any differences in these changes when comparing education funded by the 
government to education funded by private firms or independent organizations? 
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Motivation and background information for this subject is presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 
will be presenting the theoretical framework including labor supply and labor demand, and a 
social welfare model for a government’s resource allocation problem. Chapter 4 presents the 
analysis framework and hypotheses constructed to answer the research questions. A 
descriptive analysis is conducted in chapter 6, while the results from the estimations are 
presented in chapter 7. Chapter 8 discusses the findings and how useful they are to explain the 
research questions. The final conclusions are presented in chapter 9, together with suggestions 
for further research concerning this subject. 
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2. Motivation and Background 
The motivation to do research around this topic is to study the effects of the demand for 
education on different levels of education, for different regions in Norway, and how this has 
developed through time. Other research has been done involving this topic, e.g. Cappelen et 
al. (2013) and Chow & Shen (2006) (the latter based on the population of China), and it will 
be interesting to compare the results and outcome to these similar studies to either support or 
put the results up for discussion. Education is an important factor for personal welfare and for 
a country’s welfare. Being able to develop advanced skills, research and develop new 
innovations, important technology and knowledge will benefit the society by improving life 
quality, increasing positive and reducing negative externalities from consumption and 
production, and increase the tax payment in a country (Wolfe & Haveman, 2002). 
A dynamic environment where the markets for products and services experience changes 
almost all the time sees the need for adaptability being crucial in order for a firm to stay 
competitive and respond to changes that can be disadvantageous compared to their 
competitors’ behavior. The firms will have certain preferences for what to look for when 
demanding more labor, and hiring workers the right mix of skills could make a huge impact 
on their degree of competitiveness in a market (Lazear & Gibbs, 2009). The hiring decision 
will also depend on a firm’s allocation of resources towards capital and labor, and further 
employment will only be done if the value of the marginal product for capital is greater than 
or equal to the wage rate, as long as the value of an additional hire is greater than the cost 
(Borjas, 2013). Various analyses will be conducted examining variation across regions for a 
given time period and variation across time for a 15 year time period, both based on public 
and private education spending in Norway.  
The demand for education has developed quite a lot over time, and jobs that formerly used to 
require less education or none at all now require advanced education and degrees for firms to 
consider the applicants for available positions (burning-glass.com). Because of this 
development in necessary skills, the result has been general increase in the cost of labor. 
Lazear & Gibbs (2009) also explains that the more advanced the nature of a business and the 
competitive situation, the more advanced the skill mix needed. Additionally, the higher formal 
education required, the higher the marginal cost for one more unit of labor will be. This is 
why it will be crucial for a firm to hire the right employee when a small variation in 
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credentials could reveal large differences in skills and efficiency between candidates, and the 
importance is greater when the stakes are higher for the firm (in terms of higher wage paid).  
The supply of labor can be regulated by educational policies of the government to some 
degree, sketching out their goals and desired achievements based on their country’s demand 
for education. This is based on current needs for highly educated labor in different sectors 
now and in the future, and in which businesses and sectors they want to motivate expansions. 
Focus on increasing both broad and narrow skills can be shown through a government’s stated 
goals for education in their country when describing which areas are the most important to 
improve when being below par, and which should be maintained or nurtured if the students’ 
results are strong. This is more evident the higher levels of educations being examined 
(Kodde & Ritzen, 1985). At elementary schools the focus will be greater at improving 
subjects where struggles are evident while maintaining the performance level where students 
are doing well. 
Looking at higher levels of education, a government often expresses their wants for increases 
in demand and which sectors they want to focus on in the future through different channels of 
communication. This can be evident through education spending and through different 
initiatives like offering funding to events advertising what the study is like, a prospect over 
the jobs available and what a work environment for relevant professions are like. The 
Norwegian government also releases statements of what areas they want to support that will 
possibly generate benefits for both individuals and firms (Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
Through these kind of reports and public statements, they will give directions to what kind of 
studies and subjects they would like future students to enroll in. Therefore, some of the most 
important influence towards the supply of education are the student preferences and the 
necessity of a motivational factor attracting people to enroll at colleges and universities.  
An example of motivation for higher education can be found comparing the potential wages at 
post-graduation employment compared to the wages earned if they did not enroll at college. 
An example of a framework that can measure the salary effect is returns to schooling. When 
the returns from more education are greater than the opportunity cost of enrolling to college 
(e.g. by working and earning money now), they will want to enroll. As Borjas (2013) also 
states, workers will choose a level of human capital investment that will maximize the present 
value of their lifetime earnings. Models of returns to schooling have shown that the amount of 
education correlates with net earnings post education, in addition to schooling correlating 
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positively with lifetime earnings (Baum & Payea., 2004). On the other hand, the same effect 
is limited in Norway. Hægeland & Kirkebøen (2007) shows that educational premiums 
increases over time which increases lifetime earnings with years of education, but the 
differences in wages when comparing jobs and the requirement of credentials (e.g. 
comparison of different jobs where both require college education) are rather small compared 
to most of the other OECD-countries (OECD, 2011). 
There is also a considerable amount of risk involved in the human capital investment. Kodde 
(1986) points out that there are at least four important reasons to assume that these 
investments as risky. The main reason being pointed out is asymmetric information and 
adverse selection, where one side knows more than the other in a negotiation and can use this 
to their advantage. The main issue for an individual is imperfect knowledge about the value of 
their abilities and the quality of schooling. It is also impossible to know future demand and 
supply and demand conditions with certainty because of the probability of being affected by 
unpredictable. An individual will also be uncertain about his or her longevity, affecting future 
earnings. The last point of uncertainty is the uncertain timing of job offerings and uncertain 
levels of earnings after finishing a desired education.  
The uncertainty of job offers after college is one of the biggest concerns for students, and the 
risk and concern is even higher when the demand for labor is elastic. In general, this has not 
been a problem in Norway in recent times as the demand and supply of labor have been 
following each other more closely, and even with an increasing uncertainty due to a dramatic 
change in oil prices and recent layoffs in the petroleum industry it is not yet expected that the 
close relationship between supply and demand of labor will change in the short run. 
(Bjørnstad et al., 2010). The trend in the most recent time, however, is an increasing number 
of layoffs in the short run from some of the largest companies within the petroleum due to 
measures of saving and efficiency.  
In addition, Bardhan et al. (2013) shows that growth in employment opportunities and the 
demand for specific occupations tend to increase completion of higher education. With this 
information in mind, it is yet to be observed whether an increasing uncertainty in parts of the 
Norwegian labor market will have an effect in the long run for the demand for high education 
in Norway. Which implications can affect the demand for education? Like mentioned earlier, 
the economic prospects and the job situations are very important factors towards willingness 
to enroll at college, and as a basis, there should be some prospect about possibilities for future 
13 
 
job availability and potential job offers when finishing desired education (Bjørnstad et al, 
2010). Wages will also be an important factor, and an increase in wages can influence the 
degree of completion for certain occupations and sectors (Bardhan et al., 2013).  
Income and price of education will be important factors in the analysis, especially since 
capital markets are imperfect. Kodde and Ritzen (1985) explains how agents in capital 
markets are restricted in behavior towards funding education through loans and credits to 
consumers wishing to enroll to higher education because of human capital as a security “is an 
uncertain, illiquid and intangible asset”. Furthermore, the schooling model from Borjas (2013) 
shows that as long as the benefits from attending college in terms of discounted post-college 
earnings are greater than the direct cost and the opportunity cost of attending, it is worthwhile 
to attend college despite the out-of-pocket costs and the foregone earnings given up from 
working now. As a measure of utility, a person should attend college up until the point where 
the marginal future benefits of schooling equals the marginal cost (but this might lead to a 
bias if the labor market situation shifts for the specific education that a potential student 
would want to pursue). 
Technological advances have raised the bar for education, and like mentioned before this is 
making the demand for formal education more relevant (burning-glass.com). Gould et al. 
(2001) notes that former investments in technology-specific skills have become obsolete over 
time due to the exponential change in technology, and this is more evident in businesses and 
sectors where the need for innovations and improvement is greater and more imminent 
compared to others. Sources of inequality growth are therefore more evident in times with 
large technological changes and in businesses changing rapidly. The situation is the same in 
Norway, but not as strong when comparing to a number of other OECD-countries, e.g. the 
US. As Hægeland & Kirkebøen (2007) concluded, the wage inequalities are stronger between 
different sectors and in the private sector.  
The demand for education is also affected by school quality, and Card & Krueger (1990) 
shows that higher school quality gives higher returns to schooling, altering the demand for 
education to the greater when the chance for attending an educational institution of high 
quality is higher. Hægeland el al. also finds that the returns to education in Norway remain 
quite stable through time, supporting the wage premium theory from Hægeland & Kirkebøen 
(2007). Like Chow & Shen (2006) explains in their research, some countries tend to favorably 
subsidize heavily in some areas, while some choose other strategies for subsidization of 
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education like favoring subsidization for poorer regions to decrease differences from 
wealthier regions and to improve education opportunities for students and families that cannot 
afford high tuition fees and school costs. This statement will rely on a country’s policy for 
education funding, where countries favoring a larger degree of public subsidization of 
education might not show the same implication of school quality to school systems where 
tuition fees is a big part of an institution’s funding.    
To be able to study the demand for education in terms of the education spending for the two 
different components of funding, various data on income and price must be collected. As the 
price is not possible to obtain directly for all levels of education, this variable is calculated to 
a constant price estimate. This is also the case for some of the data concerning private 
education, as this is either scarce or not publicly available. All data sets are constructed by 
data collected or computed mainly from Statistics Norway and the OECD. These data will be 
used to analyze the development of the demand for education in Norway on the basis of how 
well the predictions from the OLS estimations fit the ratio of aggregate education spending 
over GDP.  
In the statistical analysis included ahead of the regression analysis, cyclical changes in the 
variables included in the analysis will be compared to and explained on the background of the 
demand and education expenditures. The statistical analysis of the education expenditures will 
be divided into separate parts, where one part will reveal the expenditure per capita for 
different levels of education, while the other part will examine the big picture by looking at 
total expenditures at different levels. The latter part will also divide this analysis into a 
government, a private and an aggregate component. This can ultimately show whether there is 
a correlation between the demand and factors like GDP and the returns to education over 
time. Education spending as a unit is also compared to different publicly funded sectors in 
Norway to illustrate the size of the education spending relative to other important 
macroeconomic units and sectors that is fully subsidized or partially funded by the 
government. 
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3. Theory 
One of the most important economic decisions a government has to do is to allocate resources 
to the various tasks and sectors funded through the national budget. Much like a consumer 
having different preferences for different goods, a government will allocate of resources to the 
sectors and causes that will yield the highest future social benefits. Like states in the 
introduction, this can be reflected in party programs and statements towards causes they 
consider the most important. Comparing this to consumer theory when the purchasing 
decision through consumer demand is made, the government must also take into consideration 
that most of their actions must be consistent with their party program. Additionally, the 
government must also act in best interest in order for their causes and verdicts to reach an 
approval from the majority of the parliament to be able to commit any changes in legislation 
and implementation of suggested reforms.  
For the simplicity, important publicly provided goods and services at a superficial level are 
assumed to be agreed upon quickly, and information about education and other goods and 
services funded by the government will be assumed the most relevant values for use in this 
study. If the government funding for different goods and services for one time period is fixed, 
the utility function for government provision of goods and services can be compared to an 
individual’s utility function when choosing an allocation of resources for a given amount of 
bundles of different goods. 
 
3.1. The Demand for Education from Individuals and Firms 
When analyzing the economic perspective of labor economics and human capital theory, an 
important feature will be the analysis of the supply side and the demand side. For a labor 
market to exist there must be one side demanding labor (employers) and one side supplying it 
(employees), just like in a basic market for goods and services (Borjas, 2013). To expand such 
a simple model of supply and demand, it is important to remember that several different 
factors will affect both the supply side and the demand side. 
In general, the labor supply side (employees) will have certain demands in terms of wage, 
work hours and other corresponding terms which the employers will have to satisfy in order 
for them to be willing to work, while the labor demand side (employers) will often have strict 
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rules and demands for what they want and who to hire for the given positions (Borjas, 2013 
and Lazear & Gibbs, 2009). The importance of such rules and conditions depend on what kind 
of firm it is and what type of business the firm is operating in, in addition to the level and 
complexity of competition, and experience and credentials of workers wanted are important 
keyword for such a topic.  
This is where the demand for education comes in when studying behavior on the supply side 
at a more detailed level. Education as an investment into human capital will positively affect 
factors like being able to choose a more desirable occupation and increase career 
opportunities, improve chances to earn a higher salary, learn important skill sets and increase 
individual productivity. It could also influence rise in perceived own social well-being and job 
satisfaction (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). Higher education is an important signal to the 
employers at the labor demand side. A formal degree proves to the employers that an 
individual possesses important skill sets and qualifications needed, and as such credentials are 
regarded as general human capital, the potential workers show that they possess necessary 
skills in addition to being able to obtain more detailed knowledge, eventually more firm-
specific human capital. The greater the results, the stronger the signal to an employer 
(everything else equal), making this an important variable when firms are screening for the 
right candidate(s). (Lazear & Gibbs, 2009) 
The demand for education can show us a perception of how important education is as a 
human capital investment and how it develops in terms of importance as a credential for 
employers. When the economy experiences shifts and shocks, it is also interesting to observe 
the effects of these. Potentially, it could lead to moderations in credential requirements, 
layoffs and shifts towards other businesses, evolution of businesses with creation of new types 
of businesses or changes to the existing ones, etc. Studies of such variations can explain 
whether these changes correlate to the general economic development in a geographical area 
or if there are important deviations from our expectations. Therefore, it will be relevant to add 
a time series analysis in order to study and estimate the demand and the education spending 
development through time.  
A loan will give a consumer (of education) the chance to cover the whole sum or parts of the 
cost in order to pursue some education of desire, and then pay it back post-graduation. 
Normally such a loan will have a significantly lower interest rate than other types of loans and 
credit solutions. A scholarship, on the other hand, is a direct payout to student(s) rather than a 
form for mortgage. Depending on a country’s funding for public education, the different 
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schools and institutions, etc., a scholarship will only be awarded to one or more students 
satisfying strict rules and conditions. For example, in the US students can receive scholarships 
because of excelling with academic results, college sports among others. In addition, there are 
also a variety of different funds or organizations awarding such scholarships for various 
reasons (but a majority requires excelling in some area). Such organizations are also present 
in Norway, but the schools themselves do not award scholarships in a similar degree. 
However, a general type of scholarship is awarded to every student with a loan through 
“Statens Lånekasse” when passing a given number of subjects (normally 30 study points per 
semester in the Norwegian system), but in addition the students must satisfy certain 
conditions like having to live at some given distance from their home of origin and wage 
earnings having to be below a given limit. Rather than a traditional scholarship, this is a way 
to reduce a student’s need for income as an active student and to reduce future costs from 
mortgage and interest rates.  
Through the time as the development of technology and innovations have led to more 
advanced goods and services, the need for more advanced knowledge and credentials has 
increased. In general, skill sets and credentials will have to change over time and the change 
depends on factors like uncertainty in a market and complexity of a business. In addition, the 
demand for credentials in recent time has resulted in employers requiring higher education 
and more advanced knowledge from potential employees. A study done by the recruitment 
agency Burning Glass in 2014 shows that a higher amount of employers demand college 
degrees for jobs where they formerly used to demand lower or no education. As skills and 
knowledge required increases, the jobs become more advanced. Many firms have hierarchical 
structures favoring division of different skills that is not directly complementary to another 
division’s skills. Since such a division of firms have become quite common, the most 
preferable kind of managers are those who possess a more general kind of skills and 
knowledge. The higher a worker climbs in a hierarchy, the more and the wider skill sets are 
required in order to do a best possible job while being able to adapt to market changes, 
optimize communication of information and to boost the results and value creation for the 
firm (Lazear and Gibbs, 2009). 
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3.2. – Labor Supply and Labor Demand 
The combination of Labor supply and labor demand is one of the most fundamental 
phenomenons within labor economics when building a foundation for the demand for 
education. In general, the labor supply is given by the supply of individuals for work, and the 
labor demand is the employers demand for labor. More specifically, the labor supply 
determines how many workers choose to enter the labor market (conditions will be specified 
later in this part) and how many hours they are willing to rent to their employers. (Borjas, 
2013). 
In general, a worker chooses a desired combination of work and leisure that can be illustrated 
by a neoclassical model of labor-leisure choice. In its most general form, the labor-leisure 
curve looks like a downward-sloping budget line showing the combination of individual 
consumption and hours of leisure for each hour worked. Specifying the neoclassical model 
furthermore, factors like non-labor income can change the look of the graph in different ways, 
and it will be normal to assume that an individual’s choice of hours to work is limited by a 
country’s legislated restrictions of maximal hours allowed to work and other individual 
limitations due to health and other personal factors that restricts the choice of maximal 
individual work hours. 
At the labor demand side, a firm will hire workers to available positions because consumers 
want to purchase a variety of goods and services. Firms hire workers to produce goods and 
services in order to fulfill some consumer demand. The demand for labor is therefore derived 
from the consumers’ preferences. As noted about the labor supply, some of the restrictions 
affecting the labor supply will also directly affect the labor demand, for instance minimum 
wages, employment subsidies and restrictions on the ability to layoff and fire workers.  
(Borjas, 2013). 
The typical similarities between classical microeconomics and labor economics is the use of 
indifference curves for utility and the isoquant for the production function, using utility for the 
labor supply side and the production function for the labor demand side. Instead of looking at 
the consumers’ preferences for bundles of goods, the approach with utility for the labor 
supply side looks at differences in preferences for workers in a labor market, showing the 
possible trade-offs for hours of work and their consumption (measured in monetary units), 
with steeper curves indicating a greater marginal rate of substitution (giving up greater 
amounts of consumption for one more hour of leisure). In order to maximize utility, the 
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consumption-leisure model must also include a budget constraint similar to the utility 
maximization problem in consumer theory.  
A lot of these factors will also be important when mixing the demand for education into labor 
supply and labor demand. Assuming that an individual is demanding some education, the 
individual will only choose to pursue this education as long as motivation is present. Whether 
it is interest in the subject and relevant courses, monetary benefits post-education or a 
combination, an individual will only pursue enrollment into education if their subject of desire 
is the one that will maximize their utility with respect to education. Looking at the labor 
demand side, the an individual’s desire (utility) to choose a certain higher education is 
affected by the behavior in the labor market from one or more firms of relevance to education 
demanded. If a firm expands (downsizes), the individual’s utility from pursuing the relevant 
education will increase (decrease). The more long-term such a situation is assumed to be, and 
the more firms doing the same, the bigger impact it will have on the utility for choosing 
education of relevance to these firms.  
3.2.1. – Labor Supply and the Neoclassical Labor-Leisure Choice Model 
Using the framework from Borjas (2013) to set up a UMAX-problem for the labor supply, a 
utility function is given as: 
 = 	(, ) (1) 
Where C = consumption and L = leisure. The indifference curve is downwards sloping and 
every combination on the curve shows an equal amount of utility along the entire curve. 
Therefore, a point showing a higher sum than any combination of the indifference curve (and 
therefore cannot be on the same curve) must be on a different indifference curve with a higher 
total amount of utility. The slope of the indifference curve is given by: 


 = −


(2)
In other words, the slope of the curve is the negative of the marginal utility of leisure divided 
by the marginal utility of consumption, and the absolute value of the slope is therefore the 
marginal rate of substitution in consumption: 
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When comparing the UMAX-problem to the consumer theory, a budget constraint in labor 
supply can be written as: 
	 = 	 ℎ	 + 	
   (3) 
Where C is consumption, w is the hourly wage rate, h is the hours allocated to the labor 
market (and therefore wh equals labor earnings), and finally V is the non-labor income. As 
this is a general model, different premiums like overtime pay and similar factors are omitted. 
When assuming that the wage rate w is constant, a redefinition of the hours worked h can be 
done to account for the time allocation an individual worker will face when allocating 
between hours of work and leisure: 
	 = 	ℎ	+ 	   (4) 
Where T is a defined time period measured in hours (e.g. hours per day, per week, etc.), h is 
hours allocated to work and L is allocated to leisure. With this new definition of time, 
switching the formula to a definition of h, the budget constraint for a worker can be rewritten 
as: 
	 = 	 ( − ) 	+ 	
   (5) 
Or 
	 = 	 (		 + 	
)	– 	    (6) 
So that hours worked equals total available time minus the time a worker chooses to allocate 
to leisure. Nevertheless, the budget line has a negative slope that for each unit of time 
decreases with the negative of the wage rate (-w). An important difference from the UMAX-
problem for a consumer when assuming any positive value of the non-labor income (V > 0), 
the budget line does not intersect the maximum possible time allocation to leisure, and thus 
reaches its minimum at V, which defines the lowest possible value at the Y-axis. A positive 
value of V, which shifts the minimum of the budget line from (L = T, 0) to (L = T, V), defines 
a new point on the graph called the endowment point E. The endowment point shows how 
much a person can consume without entering the labor market. The worker will only be 
willing to move from the endowment point if the increase in income is greater than the 
reservation wage (the minimum increase in income that makes a worker indifferent from 
between working the first hour and remaining at E), which also increases the worker’s utility. 
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What happens to the supply and the hours of work decision when some of the variables 
changes? For an individual’s utility to be maximized, an interior solution of the optimal 
consumption of goods and leisure must exist for the worker, and the budget line for the 
optimal solution must be tangent to the individual’s indifference curve of utility. Ceteris 
paribus, if the worker’s wage changes, the same value of the goods can be consumed while 
working for less hours. There is a wage effect leading to a worker allocating more hours of 
leisure to achieve the new equilibrium, and this moves the worker to an indifference curve at a 
higher utility level (leading to a shift in optimal consumption bundle). There is, however, no 
change in the endowment point E, as there is no change in the non-labor income. The 
minimum wage for a worker (given the non-labor income V) to enter the labor market remains 
unchanged. Still, when not making any further assumptions to this model, it is still possible 
that a worker will have to work more and give up more leisure hours in order to attain a 
higher utility (with slope of –w). The reason is that the new wage increases the opportunity set 
(combination of possible consumption and leisure), but in addition to increasing the demand 
for leisure, an increase in wage leads to leisure being more expensive (to have more leisure, a 
worker will have to give up more work hours. The cost for giving up one hour of work is w). 
Figure 2.1: The Labor Supply Curve, UMAX at Point P. 
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Furthermore, what happens when non-labor income V changes? Ceteris paribus, when the 
non-labor changes positively (negatively), the entire budget line shifts upward (downward). 
The endowment point shifts, so a positive shift leads to the endowment point E shifting 
upwards (and vice versa). In general, the worker can jump to a higher indifference curve and 
achieve a higher amount of utility and increases consumption at all chosen hours of work. On 
one side it means that the worker is better off no matter what, but expenditures will also 
increase. Comparing to the wage effect above, the movement along the new budget line 
depends on whether increases in income increase or decrease the consumption (ceteris 
paribus). If leisure is a normal good, the worker can choose to work less and stay at the same 
consumption level as he/she used to before the increase in V. If leisure is an inferior good, 
more hours of work is needed in order to maintain the same consumption level as before the 
increase in V. 
3.2.2. Labor Demand and the Profit Maximization Problem 
Looking at labor demand from a worker, the typical problems involved are almost identical to 
the producer theory and the piMAX-problem, starting with the production function for a firm: 
	 = 	(,)   (7) 
Where q is the firm’s output, L is the amount of labor and K is the amount of capital. The 
amount labor hours is given by the product of number of workers hired times the average 
number of hours worked per person, but Borjas (2013, p. 85) simplifies the definition of L to 
the number of workers hired by the firm. The same definition ignores the difference in 
credentials and experience between the different workers at the firm to create a simple 
definition of labor demand. The K is the monetary amount of capital in the firm, such as the 
value of machines, land and various physical inputs. Furthermore, the production function 
involves important concepts like the marginal product. For this model, the marginal product 
of labor is defined as the change in output resulting from hiring an additional worker, while 
quantities of all other inputs are held constant. The marginal product of capital is defined as 
the change in output resulting from a one-unit increase in the capital stock, holding the 
quantities of all other inputs constant.  
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In general, firms would like to maximize their profits. The general framework states that 
perfectly competitive firms in a market cannot influence prices of capital and labor. For any 
level of total production, a perfectly competitive firm maximizes its profits by hiring the right 
amount of labor and capital. The profit function for the firm is given by: 
	 = 		– 	 	– 	   (8) 
Where the pq is the total production, wL is defined as the total cost of labor denoted by unit 
cost of labor times the amount of labor hired, and vK is defined as the total cost of capital 
shown by the product of unit cost times the total units of capital hired. The price p is 
unaffected by how much output this firm produces and sells, and the price of labor and capital 
(w and v respectively) is unaffected by the amount of labor and capital hired, hence profit 
maximization is achieved through hiring the “correct” amount. 
Looking at the hiring decision, this model assumes that labor can be hired at a constant price 
w. Assuming a short run period, where the capital stock is constant, hiring the correct amount
of workers can be denoted by a breakeven point when considering that there is no variation in 
prices relative to output or input. The breakeven constraint of optimal hiring can be defined as 
the value of hiring an additional unit of labor must equal to the cost of this labor. The 
marginal gain from hiring an additional unit of labor is defined as the value of the marginal 
product of labor: 

 =  ∗   (9) 
Which is the monetary increase in revenue as a result of hiring an additional worker. The 
breakeven constraint can be written as: 

 = 	 (10) 
And the value of the marginal product of labor must be declining in order to show that there 
must be a limit for how many workers that can be hired and that the value of the additional 
worker hired is decreasing the more workers are being hired, or else the firm could have 
expanded by hiring an infinite amount of workers and be better off in the short run. The short 
run demand curve is the downward-sloping portion of the	
. This is also the portion of
the 
-curve that lies beneath the value of the average product, where the value of the
average product can be defined as: 

 =  ∗ 	   (11) 
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The relationship between the price for labor and the number of workers hires is shown 
through the labor demand curve. The curve shifts upward when labor becomes more 
expensive, while a drop in the wage cost could lead to a change in quantity demanded. A 
positive (negative) change in the output price p while holding the wage cost equal leads to an 
increase in employment because of a corresponding change in the 
.
In the long run, however, the capital stock is no longer constant and the firm maximizes its 
profits by choosing how many workers to hire and how much capital stock (plant, equipment, 
etc.) to invest in. The possible combinations of labor and capital at the same level of output 
are defined as an isoquant. An isoquant is equivalent to a worker’s utility function, with the 
production function being q = f(K, L). Different isoquants denotes different production levels, 
giving all capital-labor combination that produce a specific number of output. An isoquant 
must be downward sloping, different isoquants do not intersect, higher isoquants show higher 
levels of output, and all isoquants are convex to the origin. 
Figure 2.2: The Demand for Labor, piMAX at Point P 
While the isoquant shows the possible production possibilities for some number of output, the 
isocost line shows the possible combinations of capital and labor that a firm can hire for a 
specific cost outlay (much like the function of the budget line). One specific isocost line 
shows all possible combinations of capital and labor for a specific cost outlay, and a higher 
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(lower) line denotes a higher (lower) costs. The isocost is denoted by the firm’s cost of 
production: 
	 = 	 	 + 	 (12) 
Like stated in the beginning of this chapter the firm wants to maximize profits by minimizing 
their costs, and in the long run they want to minimize the cost for both capital and labor. The 
optimal combination of inputs for a firm is defined by the cost-minimizing solution where the 
isoquant equals the isocost: 


=


(13) 
This means that cost-minimization requires that the marginal rate of technical substitution is 
equal to the ratio of prices. This can also be denoted by: 


=


 (14) 
So the last worker hired at wage rate w must equal the last unit of capital hired at per unit 
price of capital v. Additionally, since the capital stock is not fixed in the long run, the hiring 
decision denoted by the wage rate equal to the value of the marginal product of labor must 
now also include a condition where the per unit price of capital is equal to the value of the 
marginal product of capital in order to achieve cost minimization: 
	 = 	 
		 = 
  (15) 
3.2.3. The Neoclassical model of labor and leisure, an approach for schooling 
With the framework from Borjas (2013) about the neoclassical model of labor-leisure being 
used as the general framework for labor-leisure decisions, Kodde & Ritzen (1984) expands 
this model with the demand for education in focus. With former research suggesting a 
negative price effect and a positive income effect for the demand for education, Kodde & 
Ritzen (1984) uses an integrated consumption-investment model to investigate and confirm 
the results from these studies. Consumption is modelled by assuming that allocation of time 
towards education will exert a positive impact on an individual’s utility function, and “the 
consequence of the positive marginal utility of education is that pecuniary (monetary) and 
non-pecuniary benefits of schooling jointly determine the optimal amount of education” 
(Kodde & Ritzen, 1984). 
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As the expanded model also uses demand for education as a way to maximize an individual’s 
utility, a utility function can be written as U(q1, q2, s). An individual maximizes his/her utility 
by demanding an optimal combination of first and second-period commodities, q1 and q2 
respectively, and by allocating time to schooling s. Relative prices, p1 and p2, are assumed 
constant in both periods of time. In addition, the feasible demand of consumption depends on 
an individual’s maximum wealth while assuming some endowment. The maximum wealth is 
the sum of initial endowment A and maximum discounted labor earnings adjusted for out-of-
pocket costs of education. The total time available, T, is defined as the total time in period 1 & 
2 and can be allocated to work and education. (Kodde & Ritzen, 1984) 
The expanded model excludes the time allocation between work and leisure, and instead 
focuses the allocation of time T towards work (h) and education (s). Instead of assuming that 
allocating time to anything but work leads to nothing but forgone earnings, allocating time 
towards education s is rather assumed to raise future wage rate. In such a two period model, 
the future benefits of schooling in period 2 are assumed to be zero and all time will be 
allocated to work (no investment towards general human capital occurs in the second period).  
3.3. Utility Maximization for the Social Planner, n goods 
In reality, the government will of course have a huge variety of different goods and services to 
allocate between when making a provisioning decision. The framework from 3.2 can be 
expanded to reflect a case that looks more like the government’s decision of funding and 
provisioning of public goods and services. This can be done by using the general framework 
from Snyder & Nicholson (2008) with the addition of the framework of a social planner like 
Pigou (1932) in order to make the general framework measure social welfare. The consumer 
utility is changed to the utility of a social planner (Black et. al., 2009): 
	 = 	(,, … ,)   (16) 
Which is a simplification of the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function (Bergson, 1938). 
This simplified version of the social welfare function takes aggregate consumption of public 
goods and services   as determinants and omits factors of labor demand and supply. A
commonly used application of this function is to look at the individual social welfare with H 
consumers in the economy:  
	 = 	(,, … ,)   (17) 
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There are n different goods or services that the government will have to allocate their 
available resource between for provisioning, the aggregate consumption of public education 
denoted as	. This is utility function is constructed to denote social welfare by government
provisioning of various goods and services that generates social utility. The use of such a 
generalized form of social welfare omits the endowment of goods because it is assumed 
irrelevant when the main factor of endowment for public goods is the government funding 
from the national budget. More specifically, some goods and services can be consumed by 
paying for the amount being consumed with price variation depending on supply. On the other 
hand, goods and services like public education is not endowed to some specific sum since the 
government subsidizes public education entirely (except from some minor administration 
fees). A cost of this kind of service, however, can be expressed through tax payment from the 
population. 
In order to set up the utility maximization problem, the budget constraint would also need to 
be altered in order to find the intersect of the optimality between the indifference curve and 
the budget constraint. The budget constraint for the n-good case can be written as: 
	 ≥  −  − 	…− 	   (18) 
With G denoting government revenue as the relevant income. And with maximization 
assuming that all income (wealth) is spent in provisioning of goods and services: 
 −  −  − 	…− 	 = 0   (19) 
The expansion of the utility maximization problem into n number of goods is defined as: 
(	 = (,, … ,) s.t.
 − 	  −  − 	…− 	 = 0   (20) 
The lagrangian expression for the utility maximization problem with n goods can be written 
as: 
												 = 	(,, … , ) + 	(G -  −  − 	…− 	 )   (21)
With the allocation between n number of goods, the first order conditions for the Lagrangian 
expression yields n+1 equations as necessary conditions for an interior maximum: 
	
	

=
	
	

− λ = 0	   (22) 
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	
	

=
	
	

− λ = 0	   (23) 
⋮  
	
	

=
	
	

− λ = 0	   (24) 
	
	
= 	− 	 −  − 	…− 	 	= 	0	   (25) 
Rearranging the expressions of the first order conditions yields a general expression of the 
relationship between the marginal utilities and their respective prices when comparing two 
goods: 
/

/

 = 


=> MRS(		) =  (26) 
Since the lagrangian multiplier  equals the rate of marginal utility of a good by its respective
unit price, each of the goods provisioned should yield the same marginal utility per dollar 
spent on provisioning of these goods. This assumes that each of the ratios should be equal; if 
one of the ratios are different, there is not an equal marginal enjoyment per dollar for each 
goods. When the funds are not optimally allocated utility has not been maximized. 
Solving the last one of the first order conditions will yield the interior maximum for each 
good that the government wants to fund, giving the Marshallian demand for each goods (n 
different Marshallian demand functions): 
∗ = 	 (,, … ,,)	   (27) 
∗ = 	 (,, … , ,)	   (28) 
⋮  
∗ = 	 (,, … ,,)	   (29) 
The maximum utility from the n-good case can therefore be written generally as: 
 ! 	!	 = 	(∗,∗, … ,∗) 	= 	
(,, … , ,)	   (30) 
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Figure 2.3: Social Welfare Function with Two Public Goods. WMAX Point C with Budget 
Line:  	 ≥ 	 
 + 	"
3.3.1. Substitution, Income and Price effect 
Looking at the utility maximization problem, the given inputs makes it possible to compute 
the Marshallian demand function for all the n goods and services for a status quo situation. 
Expanding this analysis makes it possible to study the effects and changes in allocation and in 
optimality when one or more prices change, or when the income changes. A change of one 
price might possibly affect the provision of other goods and services, depending on the 
amount of the change and how much is being allocated towards the affected good compared 
to the other. The price effect is the sum of the income effect and the substitution effect. A 
total price effect will therefore depend both on a relative price change for the different goods 
the government provides and in the available income a government has available for 
provisioning. 
Considering the Marshallian demand functions from the indirect utility, given in equation 29. 
All prices and the income I from these equations are exogenous, so changes in prices will shift 
the budget constraint and force the government to make different allocation choices. When 
focusing on the education spending, the most important aspects will therefore be what 
happens when the price of education rises, the price of a different good than education 
changes, and what happens to education spending when available income I changes.  
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The definition of the substitution effect says that the consumption patterns will be allocated in 
such a way that it still equals the MRS of a new price ratio when one of the provided good’s 
price changes, even if the government stays on the same indifference curve. Defining the 
borderlines of the government's budget constraint, allocating all of the government revenue G 
to education is equal to	 

, while allocating it all to some other good can be written as	 

 if:  
 ≠ 	  and	 = (,, … ,).   (31) 
Starting with a price change for the price of education, there is an initial price	
 . The new
price after the price change is	
 . All other prices and the available revenue G are assumed
unchanged. This leads to a change in the budget constraint, from initial budget to new budget, 
where: 
	 = 	 
 	+ 	
 +⋯+ 
 	   (32) 
Changes to 	 = 	 
 	+ 	
 +⋯+ 
 .   (33) 
First, a change in the price of education leads to some shift in the budget constraint. If the 
price of education falls, the budget constraint shifts so that the government can afford a 
greater quantity of education  (ceteris paribus). The opposite happens when the price of
education changes from 
  to 
 . Ceteris paribus, the government can now only afford some
smaller amount of education . Part of this is due to the substitution effect, but in addition
there is also some income effect. The same happens if the initial price of education remains 
the same, but a change in price of a different good, ,  changes from an initial price to a new
price. The income effect arises because the price change leads to a change in the 
government’s real income (or real wealth). While the substitution effect assumes staying on 
the same indifference curve, the addition of the income effect results in a move to a different 
indifference curve depending on whether the price increases or decreases. 
Assuming that the prices stays the same, a change in the government’s wealth available for 
provisioning of public goods and services is a result of a change in purchasing power. 
Depending on the direction of the change, a change in purchasing power results in a 
corresponding change in expenditure for all goods and services. A change in wealth still 
assumes that the MRS-relationship remains constant since the utility-maximizing conditions 
require the MRS to remain constant when moving to a higher level of utility, and this leads to 
a parallel shift of the budget constraint. In terms of the government demand of provisioning, a 
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change in the income leads to a direct change in demand (depending on positive or negative 
change), while a change in the price of a good or service leads to a change in the 
government’s demand for this good (increase in demand if the price decreases while their 
demand for this good decreases if it’s price increases, ceteris paribus). In addition, the income 
and the substitution effect depends on whether the goods affected by the changes are normal 
goods or inferior goods. If the change in a good’s price leads to an opposite change in 
demand, the good is a normal good, so if the change in demand goes in the same direction as a 
price change it is an inferior good. 
The sum of the substitution effect and the income effect is called the price effect. Snyder & 
Nicholson (2008) formally states the price effect given by the Slutsky equation. First of all, 
the substitution and income effect, respectively, are formally defined as: 
Substitution effect = 



= 



|   (34) 
Income effect = -



 ∙ 


= -



 ∙ 


  (35) 
The Slutsky equation sums these two equations into one expression defining the price effect: 



 = substitution effect + income effect   (36) 



=



| 	− 	.   (37) 
When comparing the framework for individual consumption and resource allocation to the 
framework of welfare economics, the measurement of the demand elasticities plus the 
division of elasticity measurement into a substitution, income and price effect hold when 
comparing to the neoclassical theory of welfare economics (Pigou, 1932, p. 72). The 
substitution effect is always negative as long as there is a diminishing MRS. A fall (rise) in 

reduces (increases) 


, in addition to MRS decreasing (increasing). This can only occur along
an indifference curve if y increases or if 
 rises if y decreases. The sign of the income effect
depends on the sign of 



. For a normal good 



 is positive, and the entire income effect is
negative. Both in the substitution and the income effect, price and quantity moves in opposite 
directions. Since they both work in the same direction, they will yield a negatively sloped 
demand curve. For an inferior good, 



 < 0 and the two terms in equation … will have 
different signs. 
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For this paper, an important measurement to be done in the analysis is estimation on the 
background of secondary data, measuring the income and price effect of demand in terms of 
elasticities. Elasticities of demand shows the sensitivity or the responsiveness of the quantity 
demanded when the income or the price changes. Some of the commonly used demand 
elasticities are derived from the Marshallian demand functions of the different goods and 
services. For the government case, the Marshallian demand function will be the Marshallian 
demand for education  , where ∗  = (
 ,
 , … ,
 , #). The following definitions of
elasticities observes the effects on the good y as a generalization for any  = (,, … ,):
Price elasticity of demand: $
, =
∆
/

∆/
= 
∆

∆
∙

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
∙


 (38) 
Measures the proportionate change in quantity demanded in response to a proportionate 
change in a good’s own price 
Income elasticity of demand: $
, = 
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     
Measures the proportionate change in quantity demanded in response to a proportionate 
change in income 
Cross-price elasticity of demand: $
, = 
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 (40) 
Measures the proportionate change in quantity demanded of y (or ) demanded in response
to a proportionate change in the price of some other good (j). 
(39) 
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4. Methodology and Data
4.1. The Model, Regression of the Demand Analysis and Estimating Variables 
The main objective in this paper is to study the demand for education in Norway through the 
education spending of the government and private institutions, and to show the impact of 
income and price variables on the ratio of education spending to GDP. A statistical analysis 
will also compare it to different data like GDP, returns to schooling and to some of the 
Norwegian government’s largest expenditure items in order to explain any eventual 
differences and outcomes from the analysis. The demand is derived from quantitative changes 
in education spending, and the model itself is based on a study done by Chow & Shen in 2006 
about the demand for education in China. 
The model being used is an OLS estimation with a relevant population figure being used as 
weight on the different numbers. The reason for weighting the data against the population is 
that the purpose of the model is to measure two different effects in terms of their elasticity, 
using a log-log regression. The first effect being measured in the model is the income effect 
through the individual income. The second effect is the price effect being accounted for 
through an estimated price for education. This gives the following regression: 
ln q = % + % ln − 	% ln + !	 (41) 
Which implies ln pq =  % + % ln + (1 − %) ln + !	 (42) 
%  and %  denotes the income and price elasticities. The individual demand for education
services measured by quality-adjusted school enrollment (divided by a population figure 
depending on the analysis conducted) is denoted q, and is the main dependent variable. The 
income effect is measured as an elasticity through the %, where d is equivalent to the private
income I, defined as the real income per capita defined as the inflation-adjusted GDP per 
capita measuring this in constant Norwegian kroner. All monetary numbers measured in this 
analysis is measured in Norwegian kroner (denoted NOK) except when indicating the use of 
other monetary units. Finally, the % measures the price effect as an elasticity of the price p.
The price p is defined as the total education spending by the product of student enrollment 
and the consumer price index. An important implication to the price definition is that the per 
student cost from the p accrues to the provider of education, and is an estimation of the price 
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for education for one individual student. For the second regression, pq denotes the total 
education spending in constant prices by the population figure. 
To capture geographical variations and differences that might be present in Norway, the 
income elasticity is estimated by using cross-regional data from each of the 19 counties. This 
analysis will not cover data for other Norwegian territories like Svalbard, Jan Mayen and any 
eventual data for the offshore sector in the Northern Sea. For the price effect, time series data 
will be used to provide historical changes and development over time. An important feature in 
these two equations and any configurations of these used in this analysis is that these 
equations hold as long as log d across provinces does not correlate with log p (correlation = 
0), but this is not possible to test without data for quality-adjusted enrollment across 
provinces.  
As long as this assumption hold, Chow & Shen points out that it is possible to regress ln pq on 
ln d with the (1 - %)ln p term absorbed in the residual. This assumption is important because,
like in Chow & Shen’s study, this assumption can only be tested if there is publicly available 
data on the price of quality-adjusted enrollment across provinces. It is still possible to assume 
that provinces with higher per capita income may spend more per student enrolled, with the 
possibility that education quality might be higher in these provinces, but for countries like 
Norway with a high degree of public subsidization and no direct enrollment costs (except for 
a small tuition fee for high education) this might not be the case since education opportunities 
does not have to depend on family income. In order to conduct an analysis with one estimate 
based on cross-regional data and the other based on time series data, the estimated income 
elasticity a is inserted in a transformed equation to estimate ln p: 
ln  − & ln = % − % ln  + ! (43) 
Which can be simplified to ln qia, where the estimated coefficient of the income elasticity %
from equation 41 is now defined as α. An alternative definition for the estimated price 
elasticity is b. The analyses at the different levels of education observe that ln p is used as the 
dependent variable, regressing ln qia on ln p. To control for any possible bias from 
simultaneity in this estimate, ln p can be regressed on ln qia, with any significant differences 
between the two estimates suggesting a possible bias. The estimate obtained from ln qia is the 
inverse of the price elasticity b. Next, the demand analysis will be conducted on three 
different levels of education. When adding primary, secondary and higher education into 
separate analyses, the equation can be transformed into: 
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ln  = 	 % + 	% ln + , = '1 − %( ln  + !,  = , ), ℎ (44) 
where (p, s, h) denotes primary, secondary and higher education. The term defined as v is just 
a simplification of the original equation, and for the two-step analysis denotes that the price 
effect '1 − %( ln  is absorbed in the residual. This regression splits the analysis into three
different levels, making it possible to generate different outcome and to show eventual 
significant differences between the different levels of education. From the social welfare part 
in the theory, an additional way to think of the three different levels is to denote  =
	,,, and the government faces an allocation decision between the three levels. The
exception is for high education, where cross-regional data will be used to estimate the income 
effect, but the price effect will be estimated through a time series with the total demand for 
high education as dependent variable (with these estimated income effects as comparison for 
the estimated income effect from this part). 
The formerly stated equations for regressing demand for education and education spending at 
the different levels of education are being used for the primary and secondary levels of 
schooling, and for high education. Chow & Shen points out that government revenue is an 
important explanatory variable for higher education, and this is also the case in Norway where 
at least 90% of the education spending for all levels of education comes from publicly funded 
education. Liberalization of the market economy during the recent decades have also resulted 
in governmental policies and legislation that gave opportunities for private schools to 
establish in addition to the already existing independent schools, and the number of students 
at private schools and educational facilities, have risen through these years (see the appendix).  
Therefore, the demand for education is decomposed into government and non-government 
demand with their own income and price variables. This analysis is conducted being aware of 
available data about private education being very scarce, especially due to big changes to 
legislation concerning private and independent schools. While enrollment and expenditure 
data for private education are available for the entire time period (stats.oecd.org), cross-
regional data can only be found for a limited time period from 2005 to 2009 (ssb.no). This 
does not affect the time series analysis for the demand for high education, but the collected 
and estimated data will be used when analyzing aggregate demand.  
The problem with this model is that even though most variables can be divided into 
government and non-government, the issue about regional quality-adjusted enrollment still 
holds at the primary and at the secondary level of schooling, and this is not possible to find 
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separately due to no publicly available data about this. These two components are therefore 
aggregated in the time series analysis for primary and secondary education, and the analysis 
of education demand for different levels of education also sees high education aggregating 
enrollment data to provide an estimate of income and price effect for each level. The 
dependent variable in a cross-regional analysis is the total education spending for an 
appropriate population measure, while the two-step time series analysis uses the income-
adjusted enrollment (or with price as dependent variable to check for simultaneity). The cross-
regional analysis takes income as explanatory variable, while time two-step time series uses 
price only (eventually the income-adjusted enrollment). The pure time series analysis used in 
the aggregate demand analysis uses both income and price as explanatory variables to the 
total education spending or the education spending to real GDP ratio. 
Even if the first analysis also includes aggregate enrollment for high education, data are 
publicly available both about private and public higher education. For the government 
demand,   denotes the real government revenue per capita and the price  !  is defined as
budgetary spending divided by the product of student enrollment and the consumer price 
index. For the demand for private education, the income variable y is the real GDP per capita, 
while the price component ! is given the non-budgetary spending (private spending) divided
by the product of enrollment and the consumer price index. This gives a general regression 
equation of the demand for higher education: 
ln  = 	 % + 	% ln − 	% ln  ! + % ln − %" ln ! + 	!,  = , ), ℎ (45) 
Which implies 
	ln  = 	 % + 	% ln + (1 − 	%) ln ! + % ln + (1 − %") ln ! + 	!,  = , ), ℎ (46)
Both the government and the private income component is adjusted for inflation to measure 
revenue and income in constant Norwegian Kroner. Finally, the regression will be configured 
to estimate the aggregate demand for education. This part of the analysis should give output 
for a general model, and the main purpose of the aggregate demand for education is to try to 
provide an explanation of the peak and slight decrease in the Norwegian education spending. 
Each element in this regression is now given the superscript a to denote that they are variables 
in the aggregate analysis. When explaining the ratio of education expenditure to real GDP, ln 
d from equation 44 is subtracted from both sides. The aggregate demand regression equation 
in this case can be written as: 
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ln( /) = 	 % − (1 − %)	ln	 + (1 − %)	ln	 + 	!	 (47)
The relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables in this 
equation can be interpreted through the study done by Chow & Shen (2006): 
“If the income elasticity is not much below unity and the price elasticity is substantially below 
unity, the ratio of education spending to GDP will increase as income increases since the 
income term on the right-hand side will have a positive or a small negative effect while the 
price term shows that an increase in price resulting from an increase in demand will assert a 
positive effect.” (Which is the case if there is a positive income elasticity α and a positive 
price elasticity p after insertion into the equation, with the size of each elasticity in accordance 
to the citation.) 
The equation of aggregate demand concludes the main objective of this analysis; to analyze 
the impact and effect of income and price on the ratio of a country’s education expenditures 
over GDP. With this equation in mind, this analysis will be divided into two parts. The first 
part is a two-step analysis based on equation 44, using cross-regional data to estimate the 
income elasticity and time series data to estimate the price elasticity, by first regressing total 
(aggregate) education spending on income, while the time series needs the constructed 
variable ln qia, regressing ln p on ln qia. This analysis will yield estimates for fitted values for 
the elasticities that can be inserted into equation 47. A second time series analysis can be 
conducted to control for a possible bias by the computed inverse estimate for the price effect, 
by regressing ln qia on ln p. Finally, the aggregate ratio of total education expenditures over 
GDP is used to estimate the elasticities by regressing time series data only. The outcome 
yielded from this part gives a predicted model of the actual spending over GDP ratio. The 
outcome from the estimations will give indications about the goodness-of-fit, and plausibility 
of the fitted and predicted values actually explaining the real spending over GDP ratio. 
The last analysis splits the aggregate analysis into two components with primary, secondary 
and high education data aggregated. Both of the separate components will be analyzed 
through two of the different methods introduced. The first part will be the two-step analysis of 
government and private education (separately), and the second part analyses whether income 
and price effects can explain the total education spending to GDP ratio through time series 
analysis of equation 44. While the two-step analysis is conducted from equation 44, only the 
private component can use equation 44 directly for the pure time series analysis of the 
spending ratio. Since the dependent variable takes GDP, and not government revenue, the 
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dependent variable must be reconfigured in order to properly control for the effect of 
government income and price of education. This is done by subtracting ln GDP from both 
sides of equation 47: 
ln *	

#

$

+− &  ln = 	 % 

− ln + *1 − 	% 
+ ln   + ! (48) 
The fitted (two-step) and predicted (time series) values will then be plotted against the 
observed values of the education spending over GDP ratio, with regression data giving some 
indication of the goodness-of-fit before plotting. 
4.1.1. Fixed Effects and Random Effects in Panel Data 
A demand analysis like demand for education will often rely on some sets of panel data in 
order to estimate demands. Panel data is defined as a dataset where the behavior of 
individuals is observed across time. Each individual can be a person as well as companies, 
public institutions, countries etc. Panel data also allows control for variables that are not 
directly observable or measurable. It also allows control for variables that change over time, 
but not across different individuals or entities.  There are two different effects that can explain 
the results from the sets of panel data, fixed effects and random effects. 
Torres-Reyna (2007) gives an explanation of these two effects both theoretically and 
mathematically. The fixed effect is used to explore the relationship between a predictor and 
outcome variables within some entity. Each entity has its own individual characteristics that 
may or may not influence the predictor variables. Considering a regression equation with one 
dependent variable and one independent variable, the equation for the fixed effect can be 
written as: 
, = 	 %- + 	& + 	!, i = 1,2,…,n ; t = 1, 2, …, T   (49) 
Where , is the dependent variable for an entity i and in time t, % is the coefficient of the
independent variable -, & is the unknown intercept for each of the n entities. ! is the error
term for each entity i across time t. To show that there is a fixed effect, the model can be 
averaged over time by dividing the equation by T (Wooldridge, 2009). This can be written as: 
,. = 	 %-. + 	& + 	!.   (50) 
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Where ,. = 	 %∑ ,& . Similar expressions are used for the independent variable and the
error term, but the intercept & remains fixed over time. Subtracting equation 49 by 50 yields
time-demeaned data for each of the non-fixed variables, while the unobserved fixed effect &
disappears. This is shown by: 
,0 = 	 %-0 + 	!0 , I = 1, 2, …, n ; t = 1, 2, …, T   (51) 
Where ,0 = 	 , − 	,., and so on. This is also called the within transformation. Since OLS-
regression on this equation uses time variation in y and x within each cross-sectional 
observation, and with the fixed effect	& eliminated from the regression, Wooldridge (2009)
recommends estimating the equation by pooled OLS. A pooled OLS estimator based on time-
demeaned variables is called a fixed effects estimator, or a within estimator. A between 
estimator can be obtained as the OLS estimator on the cross-sectional equation 61. The time 
average T is used for both y and x before running a cross-sectional regression.  
The use of fixed effects assumes that something within the individual may impact or bias the 
predictor or outcome variables, and this is necessary to be controlled for. Under a strict 
exogeneity assumption on the explanatory variables the fixed effects estimator is unbiased. 
Fixed effects will remove the effect of time-invariant characteristics, making it possible to 
assess the net effect of the predictors on the outcome variable. A second assumption to fixed 
effects is that time-invariant characteristics are unique to the individual and should not 
correlate with other individuals’ characteristics. Due of omitting time-invariant 
characteristics, the estimated coefficients of a fixed-effects model cannot be biased. Since 
each entity is different, their error term and constant (% or c) should not be correlated with
the others’. More formally, the error term for each entity must therefore be homoscedastic and 
serially uncorrelated across t (Wooldridge, 2009). Correlation between individual’s error term 
leads to fixed effects not being suitable since inferences may not be correct and this might be 
a relationship to be modelled by random effects. In case of unbalanced panels, in data sets 
where some years are missing for some cross-sectional units in a sample, the estimation will 
change from time T to the number of time periods for cross-sectional data, . The sum of
cross-sectional time periods is	 + 	 +⋯+ 	. It is important that the data missing is of
such a character that the set becomes a nonrandom sample. 
Random effects, on the other hand, occur when the variation across entities is assumed to be 
random and uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables included in the model. 
For a regression model with random effects, the equation can be written as: 
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, = 	 % + 	%- +⋯+ %'-' + 	& + 	!, i = 1,2,…,n ; t = 1, 2, …, T (52) 
Or 
, = 	 % + 	∑ %-' + 	& + 	 ! , t = 1, 2, …, T ; j = 1,2,…,k (53) 
Where an intercept is included to assume that the unobserved effect, &, has zero mean. The
main purpose in fixed effects and first differencing models is to eliminate &  due to it’s
correlation with with one or more of the -. In this case, though, the unobserved effect is
assumed uncorrelated with each of the explanatory variables in all time periods. 
Transformation to eliminate &  will therefore result in inefficient estimators (Wooldridge,
2009). Assuming that an unobserved effect & is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable
leads to equation 50 becoming a random effects model: 
1-,&2 = 0,  = 1, 2, … ,	; 3 = 1, 2,… ,4.	 (54) 
In addition to this assumption, all the assumptions from fixed effects also holds for the 
random effects model. In order to estimate %, a key feature to the model is the composite
error term, which can be defined as 
 = & + !. The equation from the unobserved effects
model can now be rewritten as: 
, = 	 % + 	%- +⋯+ %'-' +  .	 (55) 
With & in the composite error term, the term is serially correlated across time for each j.
Therefore, under the random effects assumptions: 
'
,
( = (
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,  ≠ ).	 (56) 
Where 5  = Var(&)  and 5+  = Var(! ). Such a positive serial correlation shows that a
potentially substantial error term leads to pooled OLS regression will be incorrect when the 
standard error ignores this correlation, and this leads to the test statistics also being incorrect 
(Wooldridge, 2009). 
Random effects also assume that an entity’s error term does not correlate with the predictors, 
allowing the time-invariant variables to act as explanatory variables. Individual characteristics 
that may or may not influence the predictor variables must be specified, and omitting one or 
more of these characteristics might result in an omitted variable bias. (Torres-Reyna, 2007) 
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The big question that arises when dealing with panel data is to determine whether an 
unobserved effect is a fixed or a random effect. Knowing that the fixed effects allows 
arbitrary correlation between & and -, while random effects does not allow this, the fixed
effects are thought to be the more convincing tool for estimation of ceteris paribus effects. 
But, if the key explanatory variable is constant over time it is not possible to use fixed effects 
to estimate its effect on Y, while being aware of only using random effects when assuming 
that the unobserved effects are uncorrelated with all explanatory variables. It is therefore 
common to include as many time-invariant controls as possible among the explanatory 
variables (which is not necessary to include in a fixed effects analysis). Random effects are 
also more efficient in a general than in a pooled OLS estimation (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Both effects are still applied in various papers and then formally test for statistical significant 
differences in the coefficients on time-varying explanatory variables in order to determine 
whether unobserved effect(s) is (are) random or fixed effects. The first to propose such a test 
was Hausman (1978). Comparing to the framework presented in this part so far, the main idea 
of the Hausman-test is to use random effects estimates with the covariance from equation 51 
as a null hypothesis, or else the null hypothesis of random effects is rejected by this test. As 
Wooldridge (2009) also states, a failure to reject the null hypothesis means that either random 
effects and fixed effects estimates are sufficiently close, so it does not matter which one is 
being used, or the size of sampling variation is so large in the fixed effects estimates that it is 
impossible to conclude that practically significant differences are statistically significant. This 
might happen due to lack of information in the data in order to obtain precise estimates. On 
the other hand, a general rule for the Hausman test is that a rejection leads to the assumption 
from the random effects equation being false, and therefore fixed effects estimates are to be 
used.  
4.1.2. Analyzing the Demand for Education in Norway 
Why is Norway an interesting area to study the demand for education? First of all, it is 
because the current state and the development of the Norwegian economy is very significant 
compared to other countries, which does have a lot to do with a high demand for e.g. 
petroleum products from countries in emerging markets like China and India that have not 
been as badly hit by the economic crisis in 2008/2009 that many of the developed countries 
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were. Second, the development of economic markets and market powers are quite different to 
other developed economies where market liberalism is and have been stronger through time.  
Norway is a country that has been controlled through socialistically oriented governments 
during many years, where even the central bank was subject to strict government control. 
With some influence from governmental reigns of more liberally oriented parties, Norway has 
taken some steps towards a greater part of liberalism in their market economy (rather than 
reverting when shifting back to socialistic government reigns), thus limiting the public control 
over markets for goods and services. Pre-1970, Norway did not have any kind of businesses 
or industries that could generate revenues anywhere near the level they are at today, even 
though their fish industry and exports have been quite known for years for both volume and 
perception of quality worldwide (Bore & Skoglund, 2008). 
Except from fisheries, the Norwegian economy were built on farming and some minor 
industrial businesses in addition to some smaller factories and industry, which can explain the 
long-term significant import barriers (which still are quite high in some areas with only minor 
decreases). This was also a contribution to the country being a lager when it came to 
importing and implementing great innovations and new technology that most developed 
countries had enjoyed for years. After some time of speculation and research around the 
potential of finding oil reservoirs in the northern sea, the economy faced a huge positive boom 
when the oil reservoirs proved to be large and many in numbers. 
As the economy rose, the market economy had to develop and change as well in order to 
benefit global trade and large-scale export worldwide. The newfound wealth would show to 
have an impact on both a macro- and a microeconomic level. As prognoses for extraction of 
oil and increasing wealth would seem to be almost unlimited in the short term, the need for 
changing the financial policy were neglected, proving to be disastrous for some years. In the 
beginning of the 1980’s the economy shifted from a strong growth to a significant decline as 
the revenues from the oil sector declined while people’s access to mortgage and the banks’ 
willingness to lend out capital were high. The restrictions made and the revolutional changes 
made on the financial policy were long overdue, but did prove itself working and efficient 
when being implemented (Thøgersen, 2011). 
As for the model being used, the main parts of the analysis are originally used for analyzing 
the Chinese economy and the demand for education in China. It is used because of similarities 
in the two countries’ market economy and, to some extent, the degree of public market power. 
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Without comparing the governance of these two, both Norway and China are countries that 
have chosen to give the government full market power and control, but over time have 
liberalized their market power gradually, though at different rates (regardless of China being 
one of Norway’s largest buyers of oil and petroleum-related products).  
In comparison to the Chinese study, Chow & Shen wanted to perform a demand analysis on 
the background of a sudden shift in educational spending and in non-government spending. A 
similar effect is also evident in Norway, but there are some important differences when 
comparing to the most recent data. Data given from Statistics Norway (2015) based on 
numbers from 2013 shows that there might be a shift in education spending. On average, there 
has been a growth in the Norwegian government’s education spending, most significantly 
since the oil boom in the 70’s. This is due to the need for more educated labor for the 
petroleum sector in order for Norway to supply a sufficient number of engineers and 
operators, but with such an expansion in the economy it will also reveal opportunities to 
advance in other important areas, e.g. health care and various public services.  
What makes this comparison interesting in recent times is that China still is increasing 
spending on education (Yuan & Zhang, 2014), while the same spending by the government in 
Norway has leveled out some in the later years, at approximately 7% of the GDP, and some of 
the observed differences tend to cycle rather than increase or decrease in some specific 
direction (Statistics Norway, 2015) 
One big difference in the model from Chow & Shen when comparing the school systems and 
financing of these is that China uses the possibility of “leasing” public schools to offer private 
firms or organizations the possibility to run the school and claim a portion or all of the 
revenues. In Norway, it either is a pure publicly or privately run school ranging from 
elementary to higher educational institutions (but private schools does receive economic 
support/grants from the government that can only be used on the operation of these). This 
must also be taken into account, as e.g. the costs from public schools are significantly greater 
than those from private schools since there is a majority of public schools in Norway. 
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4.2. Panel Data 
For the estimation of the different variables in the regressions specified in the former parts, 
data must be provided to the analysis. Like mentioned above, estimation of the income effect 
requires cross-provincial data and the price effect estimation requires time series data, 
assuming that income and price does not correlate when cross-provincial price of enrollment 
is omitted. In order for the panel data assumption (for both fixed and random effects), it is 
also necessary that an entity’s data in the time series analysis does not correlate with other 
entities. This is important to avoid serial correlation, but for each two-step analysis this is only 
assumed to be true without being able to test it. The analysis conducted in this research paper 
is based on secondary data already available from Statistics Norway through different 
publications. Some other, important sources will also be used for data collection, like large 
databases such as the OECD.  
The first parts of the analysis will be treated in a general form without dividing different 
sources of spending because of the non-existing separation in the available data sets. To 
estimate the income effect, the equations from part 3.1 states that income in this regression is 
defined as the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. For this part of the analysis, the regression 
at a cross-regional level will be used. The data set for the cross-regional analysis is gathered 
from “Regional Accounts” with data from 2012 (Statistics Norway, 2014). This publication 
includes GDP per capita split into regions.  
For the estimation of the price effects from its elasticity, different data sets will be needed in 
order to conduct the time series analysis when the elasticity a of the income effect is given. 
This includes data for education spending, student enrollment and the yearly consumer price 
index of Norway. All data on the price effect are also based on data sets from Statistics 
Norway. Data on education spending is gathered from the statistics database KOSTRA, while 
the consumer price index and data on quality-adjusted student enrollment is collected from 
both statistics from KOSTRA and from the database of statistics at Statistics Norway. Any 
scarce or missing data sets concerning educational data at Statistics Norway are supplied from 
the OECD statistics. 
As mentioned about estimating the variables for higher education, the analysis will also be 
split into two separate parts as data from both governmentally funded and privately funded 
education is available. The data for this part of the analysis is very important when splitting it 
into a separate government and private component, as long as separate data are available for 
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both the income effect and the price effect estimation. The problem in this part of the analysis, 
which is common to the analysis done by Chow & Shen (2006) in China, is that the data 
concerning private education is very scarce and fractioned. Furthermore, the statistical 
measurement concerning facts about students and institutions has become more common in 
the most recent times, leaving a big part of the statistics databases’ collected time series data 
empty. The only data available concerning the quality-adjusted student enrollment at private 
institutions in Norway is from high education. With separate analyses for the government and 
the private component with respect to the income effect, the resulting estimates of the income 
effect will be aggregated for the time series analysis in the two-step analyses. 
When it comes to data for public and private education, these will be collected from different 
sources. As done at the lower levels of education, income and price-related data will also be 
collected from Statistics Norway. While the income effect relevant to public education   
uses the government revenue per capita, the same variable in the private component uses the 
GDP per capita. When the α and b have been estimated through their separate regressions, the 
time series analysis needs to aggregate the two variables. The government component of the 
time series analysis, with respect to the price effect, defines  ! as the government’s budgetary 
spending (for higher education) divided by the product of student enrollment and CPI. All 
relevant data for this part can be found from Statistics Norway. Due to the lack enrollment 
data for private educational institutions, the product of student enrollment and CPI is the same 
in the private component of the price effect, but the numerator in this part is the non-
budgetary education spending. While the publicly available statistics is somewhat limited in 
this area in Norway, this data is available through statistics from OECD. 
In addition to the regression of the demand for education in Norway, this analysis will also 
include comparisons to some important data like GDP, national budgets (accounts) and 
returns to schooling. This is simply to give a shallow interpretation whether or not there might 
be any relevance between these measures and the demand for education. Since education to a 
great extent is a publicly financed good, a broad measure of value creation like GDP could 
possibly give an explanation if the growth in both demand and GDP seem to correlate over 
time. Returns to schooling is an important measure for the demand for education when it 
comes to future returns as a monetary incentive to demand more education and accept an 
opportunity cost of foregone earnings by choosing not to work. Data for GDP can be found 
both from several historical reports from Norges Bank, but also from Statistics Norway where 
this data can be easily found as a time series. Data on returns to schooling is based on Bhuller 
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et al. (2011) measuring the returns in Norway over time, which makes it possible to compare 
to the estimated demand analysis. 
4.3. Important Assumptions and Hypotheses 
In the methodological framework by Chow & Shen (2006) there are some important 
assumptions on the background of the framework construction. An important first assumption 
says that there will exist an income effect and a substitution effect that are constant in terms of 
elasticities during the same period. First, depending on the size of the elasticities, there will be 
a constant income effect and a constant substitution effect. There is no preliminary indication 
made about either of them being negative or positive, but the assumption holds for both the 
government and non-government demand for education. Comparison to the outcome of the 
analysis and comparing to the general assumptions of these effects, the use of this assumption 
in this research leads to the following first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: With relative income and the relative price of education being uncorrelated, 
the income elasticities are predicted to be positive, while the price elasticities are predicted to 
be negative for all levels of education.  
Many former studies have found a negative price effect, e.g. Kodde & Ritzen (1984), and 
estimating the substitution and the price effect in the given regressions in terms of elasticities 
would be predicted to show the same result as these former outcomes. The income effect is 
also covered by measurement of elasticities, and comparing to studies such as Kodde & 
Ritzen (1984), Tannen (1978), Radner & Miller (1975) and Chow & Shen (2006) should 
reveal similar outcomes for data from Norway in terms of positive income elasticity. When 
estimating the income elasticity with cross sectional data, the variable sees a transformation to 
time series by constructing a new dependent variable ln qia, which equals ln q – a ln y.  
The second assumption is split into three different assumptions. Assumption A states the first 
one only states that the income effect can be estimated by using cross-regional data when 
there is a lack of relevant data for the price effect. The next assumption B states that the 
supply of education can be assumed predetermined because of a change in the number of 
teachers and educational facilities available increases slowly relative to an increase in private 
income or government revenue. The last assumption C states that given the income effect, an 
observed increase in price from the time series can be used to estimate the price elasticity. The 
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first assumption explains the reason for the two-step analysis being used, as data like quality-
adjusted enrollment could be unavailable, but this will also be used to estimate fitted values 
that can be compared to the real numbers collected or computed. The next two assumptions 
simply assume validity for a price elasticity estimated from time series given the estimated 
income elasticity from the cross-regional data. Even though these can be challenged, the 
validity of the assumptions is important for the empirical analysis. 
In addition to these assumptions, regression analyses conducted in the next chapter seeks to 
obtain the best linear unbiased estimates. Whether it is through simple regression (cross-
regional and time series) in the two-step analysis or through time series multiple regression, 
the Gauss-Markov assumptions must hold for these estimates to be used as possible evidence. 
Except from random samples and an expected error term equal to zero, it is also important 
that the obtained estimates are homoscedastic and show no signs of autocorrelation. 
Additionally the estimates should not show signs of multicollinearity between independent 
variables, and a good confirmation of potentially strong evidence should also show signs of 
high goodness-of-fit and a small probability of random effects (Wooldridge, 2009).  
While the validity of the assumptions is important for the analysis, some of the regression 
models must be made into time series analyses with at least two independent variables. An 
example of this is the splitting of high education into two different components. The reason 
that only high education is divided into a government and a non-government component is 
because this level of education consists of the highest percentage of educational facilities by 
total facilities, approximately 10%. While it is possible to separate both components by using 
separate cross-regional and time series data through a two-step analysis, the analysis is 
aggregated due to the lack of cross-regional expenditure data available for the private 
government institutions. Conducting the analysis for high education with total demand as the 
dependent variable predicts the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: When splitting the analysis of higher education into two components, 
government and private education respectively, income effects are assumed to be positive, 
while price effects are assumed to be negative for both the government and private 
components separately. The elasticities of private effects (income and price) are predicted to 
be slightly more sensitive than for the government. 
For the aggregate demand component, all levels of education and both components are 
computed into aggregate education spending, income and price variables in order to examine 
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the main objective of the research. This objective is fulfilled if the income effect and price 
effect is able to explain the ratio of total education expenditures over real GDP. For this 
objective to be realized, the following hypothesis must be true. When estimating the two 
different effects through equation 44 of aggregate demand, the analysis is split in two. This 
ratio is also estimated through the two-step analysis of cross-regional data for the income 
elasticity d and time series estimation of the price elasticity p. Because of a possible scenario 
where one hypothesis is made covering both methods used for the aggregate analysis, leading 
to one part of this hypothesis being true while the other is false, separate hypotheses are made 
for the two different methods of analysis: 
Hypothesis 3: Estimating the income effect through cross-regional data and the price effect 
from time series data with a constructed dependent variable of income-adjusted demand, the 
obtained elasticities can be used as fitted values to explain the education spending over GDP 
ratio in equation 44. 
Hypothesis 4: The estimation of the income effect and the price effect respectively through 
the two-step analysis, using cross-regional data to estimate the income effect and time series 
data to estimate the price effect, yields fitted values that can explain the education spending 
over GDP ratio for the government spending and private spending separately. 
The outcome from these analyses will be plotted to graphically illustrate the goodness-of-fit 
when trying to explain the spending to GDP ratio, supplied with important data from the 
analysis output to determine whether it can be used as proof. 
Following immediately is a split of the aggregative analysis into the two different 
components, government and non-government education. While this part of the analysis also 
has additional objectives of both components being able to explain the spending to GDP ratio, 
any eventual biases or lack of evidence to prove the relationship between the ratio and the 
independent variables could possible illustrate if the insufficient evidence is from one of the 
components or both. This analysis is also conducted by the two different methods, the two-
step analysis and the time series ratio. Predicting that both models could explain the spending 
to GDP ratio, the following hypotheses must be true: 
Hypothesis 5: By conducting a two-step analysis of the education spending over GDP ratio 
for government expenditures and private expenditures separately, this regression will yield 
best estimates that can explain the separate ratios. 
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Hypothesis 6: By conducting a time series analysis of the education spending over GDP ratio 
for government expenditures and private expenditures separately, this regression will yield 
best estimates that can explain the separate ratios. 
Yielding best estimates means that both the income and price elasticity estimated from the 
separate OLS estimations satisfy the Gauss-Markov theorems for best linear unbiased 
estimates. The main difference when conducting separate analysis for aggregate government 
data and private data sees the need for two different paths to correctly estimate the different 
elasticities for the two separate components. The general dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the product of price and quantity over GDP. For the private component, the 
regression of this variable is straight forward as the income variable for the private component 
is defined as the inflation-adjusted GDP. This is not the case for the government component, 
but this component cannot deviate from using the mentioned ratio as its dependent variable 
when using a specific framework of estimation. In order for this variable to make sense, 
equation 44 must be reconfigured, which is done by subtracting ln GDP (ln y) from both sides 
of the regression equation. For the government component, equation 45 is used to estimate the 
elasticities of income and price respectively. 
The fitted values and the predicted values must therefore yield close estimates to the real 
values by satisfying the goodness-of-fit assumption through the use of the above equation. 
With these hypotheses in mind, two additional hypotheses can be constructed as general 
assumptions for the entire analysis with validity being independent of the type of analysis 
conducted: 
Hypothesis 7: Assuming that estimated income elasticity is a best linear unbiased estimate, 
the estimated elasticity of income α is predicted to be positive. 
Hypothesis 8: Assuming that estimated price elasticity is a best linear unbiased estimate, the 
estimated elasticity of price p is predicted to be negative. 
The hypothesis testing of the dependence of income and the price of education on the 
education expenditures will also reveal whether income and price of education does indeed 
have an effect on the education expenditure for the respective levels. While the null 
hypothesis as a measurement of elasticity would state that being unable to reject the null leads 
to the conducted research being unable to reject that income and price is perfectly inelastic 
through equation 39 and 38 respectively. If hypothesis 1 holds for all levels of education, the 
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income effect leads to a small, positive change in the demand for education (negative if 
income decreases). The predicted negative price elasticity of demand leads to a small, 
negative change in the demand for education when the price of education   increases
(positive change if  decreases). All of these determinants would indicate that education is a
normal good in Norway. 
Any opposite effects relative to the stated hypotheses recorded from the output will reject the 
null if they are statistically significant and found robust according to the Gauss-Markov 
theorems of single regression, multiple regression and time series multiple regression analysis 
(Wooldridge, 2009). This would lead to an income effect where the demand for education 
decreases when the population’s income I increase (and opposite for a decrease in the income 
level), while an increase (decrease) in the price for education  would lead to an increase
(decrease) in the demand for education. Using frameworks like Snyder & Nicholson (2008) 
and Pigou (1932), the recently described phenomenon would suggest that the income effect 
suggests that education is an inferior good, while the price effect suggests that education 
might be a Giffen good. If the output points in this direction, further interpretation of this 
outcome will be made in the analysis and discussion. 
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5. Statistical Analysis
This section provides analysis of the research question and the hypotheses generated on the 
background of this research, theoretical framework and some similar studies done regarding 
this topic. This section will be split into two separate sections, where one section aims to 
conduct an estimation of the various effects and how they influence the government 
expenditure on education and the demand for education. The other section will include 
various statistical analyses and will try to explain the development in demand and education 
spending without estimations and regressions, on the background of a rather large and 
detailed data set concerning both dependent and explanatory variables. 
A statistical analysis is conducted in this section as the data set constructed for the purpose of 
analyzing demand for education is quite detailed when it comes to comparing demand and 
education spending with the income and price effects. As the main goal of this analysis is to 
estimate the influence of price and income effect on education demand and government 
spending both on a cross-sectional level (one year) and in time series for a specific time 
period, statistical analysis can be used as a tool to explain some effects beyond the regression 
analysis chosen for this research.  
An evident problem that might cause issues for a linear regression when conducted in the data 
from Norway, especially in the time series, is that while there is an increase in both real GDP 
per capita, the government expenditures and the enrollment numbers, there seem to be some 
fluctuations in the demand over time. In addition, there might also be some indicators that one 
or more of the effects are lagging compared to the other (which could explain an omitted 
variable bias from some of the estimations conducted above). The statistical analysis of the 
demand for education will first examine the demand and the education spending for each of 
the three levels of education separately, and then an analysis of aggregate demand will be 
conducted with comparisons to the regression analysis of aggregate demand. 
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population in these regions was 2.1 million of 4.98 million inhabitants. The total expenditures 
per capita seems to be greatly influenced by the price of primary and secondary education per 
student, since Bergen and Trondheim are the only regions above 10,000 NOK in education 
spending per capita for high education.  
While some studies like Chow & Shen (2006) points out that some countries suffer from 
biases in the funding of education where the wealthy regions have a higher school quality and 
the quality of their education is assumed to be better, the figure shows that this is not the case 
in Norway. While the largest regions have the largest aggregate education expenditures, the 
relative expenditure for primary education is smaller because of a large number of students in 
addition to a significant amount of high education expenditures. Data for per-student 
expenditure shows that some of the smaller regions have the highest per student expenditure 
for primary and secondary education (see the appendix) due to lower enrollment numbers 
because of a small population, and some of these regions might also have some considerable 
transportation costs due to a large spread in the settlements relative to the location of the 
schools (and the transportation is publicly funded).  
In total, the education expenditures for the primary education is the largest, averaging at 
approximately 311 million Norwegian kroner, while the secondary and high education are 
quite smaller with an average of 149 million kroner for secondary education expenditures and 
175 million kroner for the high education. Additionally, the size of high education 
expenditures is this large mainly because of the University in Oslo, Bergen, Tromsø and the 
NTNU (the Norwegian University of Science and Technology) plus private education in these 
regions. Only there four regions are above the average per-capita expenditure of 6,300 NOK. 
Oslo, Sør-Trøndelag and Bergen are also above 10,000 NOK, with education expenditures per 
capita of 38,000, 20,900 and 19,200 NOK respectively.  
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Looking at these same data over time, Most of the levels have experienced a steady increase 
in funding. The funds for primary education seem to have leveled out, while there seems to be 
a small decrease in the expenditures for high education. There seems to be a peak in the total 
expenditures in 2011, at a sum slightly above 120 billion NOK. As illustrated, the main 
reason for this development in the trend is due to equivalent changes in the aggregate 
expenditures of primary and high education. The per-capita changes are very small, showing 
that the spending for high education drops from 7,800 at the peak to 7,000 NOK in 2012 for 
high education and from 13,800 to 13,400 NOK for primary education in the same period, but 
the equivalent changes in these expenditures are approximately 3 billion NOK for high 
education and 1,5 billion NOK for primary education. The opposite is the case for secondary 
education, with a steady increase of approximately 6% per year. From 2011 to 2012, the 
secondary education expenditure per capita increased from 5,800 to 6400 NOK. 
The trend line showing the total education expenditures per capita seems to suggest that 
Norway might be looking a decrease in total education expenditures, and hence there could be 
a decrease in the aggregate demand for education in Norway. This is further emphasized by 
more recent data showing that funds for primary education have declined, while funds for 
secondary and high education have either leveled out or declined more post-2012 (“Facts 
about Education in Norway 2015”). Like the figure below also shows, the total enrollment 
across all levels of education seems to level out over time, suggesting that the development in 
the trend line for the demand is affected by some other factors not determined by this demand 
analysis. 
 
Figure 5.4: School Enrollment in Norway 1997-2008 
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A very important source for the demand for high education is oil related studies among others, 
but the sensitivity in other studies will also be affected by performance in the oil sector, and 
the oil sector is regarded the most important industry in Norway (Ryggvik, 2010). The value 
creation from the oil and gas sector represents approximately 25% of the total GDP in 
Norway (ssb.no). Depending on what causes an eventual fall in the performance of the oil 
sector, a significant general global decline in the activity of oil and gass could lead to a severe 
impact on the Norwegian mainland economy, while an increase in global supply only leads to 
a minor decrease in the economy (Bjørnland & Thorsrud, 2014). This goes to show that the 
former demand analyses conducted could yield stronger results if there were some kind of 
labor market factors involved in the explanation of the education spending ratio.  
 
Figure 5.5: Two Component Aggregate Education Expenditures in Norway 
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Figure 5.6:  Two Component School Enrollment in Norway 
What can be told when dividing the enrollment into two components? The increase in 
enrollment from the start of the time period in 1997 sees an increase in enrollment that 
eventually levels out. While there are small increases in the private education enrollment, the 
total enrollment numbers for private education have been close to constant both before and 
after the liberalization of the private school law in Norway. If the predicted models from the 
demand analysis can explain the education spending ratio to some degree, this must mean that 
there has been an increase in the price for private education? The estimated inflation-adjusted 
price per student for private education confirms this in the figure below. When the enrollment 
number is close to constant for private education, the increase in the total education 
expenditures for private education is shown by an increase in per-student price for the 
provider of education.  
Figure 5.7: Two Component Estimation of Inflation-adjusted Price of Education 
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Like the correlation analysis of aggregate demand shows, the development of the education 
expenditures ratio over time shows that there is some relationship between the expenditure 
and the income, but there are some important differences in the fluctuations. The variation is 
bigger for the government revenue over time, while the variation is quite low for the private 
income. What seems to be an even more important implication when comparing this to the 
education spending is that the peak in the spending, and hence the demand to some degree, is 
observed earlier in the income data than it is for the changes in education spending. This is an 
indication that the income is a leading indicator for the direction of the education funding or 
that the education spending is a lagging indicator. The term indicator is relative to the change 
in GDP and can either forecast a change in GDP or result in an occurred change in the GDP 
(Gottfries, 2013). Gottfries also indicate that employment is a lagging indicator to a shift in 
GDP. The comparison in the figure below shows that the government revenue follows the 
GDP closely, but is also slightly lagging.  
Figure 5.8: Government Revenue and Real GDP per Capita 
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seems to have peaked and leveled out for some years, while the demand for private education 
is slowly increasing. The increase of cost per-student (in terms of price) for the private 
institutions could be a result of the increase in the demand for private education and the 
liberalization in legislation, leading to an increase in the establishment of private education 
institutions. In general, the corporate decision for education funding and provisioning 
(corporate as in government or a private corporation or organization) seems to be a lagging 
factor as a result of a change in the economic situation and in enrollment numbers over time. 
Still, any suggestions for omitted variable biases seems to suggest that there is at least some 
labor market factors that must be included in order to improve the analysis framework when 
using this to analyze the demand for education in Norway. Like the data shows from the 
research of Bhuller et al. (2011), the returns to schooling in Norway is increasing from 1997 
until peaking in 2002, and then declines at a near-constant rate. Comparing this to the data of 
education expenditures, there seems to be a negative correlation between the two sides, but 
without evidence it is not possible to state whether they actually do behave in the opposite 
direction of each other, as the expenditure keeps increasing until peaking in the end of the 
time period. 
Given the ratio of education spending to real GDP, how much is spent on education compared 
to other sectors? The figure below shows an illustration over some of the largest yearly 
expenditure items that are funded by the government: 
Figure 5.9: Per Capita Government Expenditure, Sector Wise Division 
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Indeed the government expenditures are rising at a nearly constant rate of approximately 6.8% 
per year. Social security like age and disability pension plus unemployment compensation are 
the largest cost for the government at 407 billion NOK in 2012, or 81,600 NOK per capita, 
which constitutes 36.4% of the total public expenditures. The general public services at 46200 
NOK per capita include international financial support, public debt transactions, 
administration of public administrations at different levels and other services defined as 
general public services. The sum of healthcare expenditures per capita is 31,000 NOK in 
2012, and education expenditures in 2012 is the fourth largest public expenditure item at 
23,800 NOK. Public safety (police, fire departments, courthouses and jails), Military and 
defense, industrial organization (agriculture and other natural resource extraction facilities), 
and transportation are well below the other expense items, ranging between 4,600 and 18,000 
NOK per capita in 2012. Environmental protection has been at a constantly lower level 
compared to the other expense items, costing the government just below 300 NOK in 2012. 
The given sums and ranking of these have developed over time, and the given time period for 
this research shows that social security and general public services have been the two largest 
expenditure items throughout this period with small increases every year. In the earlier years 
of this period, it is evident that education expenditures were higher than expenditures for 
healthcare in Norway. The sudden, significant increase in the health care expenses happened 
due to a healthcare reform becoming effect in this time period (Jensen & Bollingmo, 2007). 
While this entire time period have seen changes in governance with different priorities within 
their budget plans, the expenses within military, public safety, industrial organization and 
transportation have only seen smaller increases in their funding, in addition to some cyclical 
fluctuations. The greatest increase in any of these was in industrial organization, with a 50% 
increase in this item from 2011 to 2012.  
While some of the former statistical analyses suggest that there might be signs of a peak in the 
Norwegian economy due to a peak in the GDP and a lagging effect in the education spending, 
figure 9 illustrates that there still is a steady increase in these expenditures. However, it is still 
possible that there could be a peak or a decline in the economy if the government chooses to 
maintain the increase in the total expenditure level. This is still possible since possible 
changes in the employment rate leads to an increase in the expenditure for social securities. 
Since this research does not intend to draw any conclusions about the economic situation in 
Norway, the next part in this analysis will try to answer the research questions and the 
hypotheses more directly. 
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6. Regression Analysis of Demand for Education
This section will conduct a demand analysis on the background of demand for education and 
the government’s education spending. The main purpose of this analysis is to base the 
analysis on a model used on a different demography to analyze the same effects estimated in 
the original model. In addition, it will also be a test of the model’s applicability showing 
whether or not it is possible to use based on data from a different country. As this model has 
been used to analyze the effects in China (Chow & Shen, 2006), the outcome will therefore 
show if it can be used to analyze these effects in Norway. The applicability could also explain 
possible problems with the analysis when used on the population of a different demography, 
like omitted variable bias and robustness issues if the output contradicts the theoretical 
framework. The amount of data and different categories included might also vary between the 
original paper and this research (as one or more categories might be included as opposed to 
the other, while some might lack due to availability of data). 
6.1.1. Demand Analysis for Three Levels of Education 
As explained in the methodology, the analysis is based on equation 40, which implies that 
equation 39 is true. The first part of the demand analysis uses this equation to estimate the 
income effect and price effect for the different levels of education i, where i = (p,s,h) denotes 
the education level (primary, secondary and high education, analyzed separately). First, the 
income elasticity is estimated by regressing total education spending for the different levels 
for education (divided by an appropriate population number) on real income per capita in 
Norway, using cross regional data of 2012. As numbers for quality-adjusted enrollment for 
the different regions is not available in Norway, this analysis will also transform the cross-
sectional analysis into a time series analysis when estimating the price effect. The variable ln 
qia is constructed as shown by equation 41, where the estimated coefficient of income 
elasticity is inserted in ln qia. This constructed variable is used in the time series analysis by 
the regression of the price effect on the income-adjusted log quantity (income adjusted 
demand). The output of this regression will yield the inverse of the price effect, where the 
regression of income-adjusted log quantity on the log price effect could determine any 
possible bias in the estimated inverse elasticity. The following table shows the estimates from 
the conducted regression for all three levels of education: 
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Table 6.1: Total Expenditures for Primary Education 
Explanatory Variable: Coefficient Value: Standard Error: T-value: 
Intercept of ln pq 6.508 2.256 2.884 (0.014)
Income elasticity -0.252 0.286 -0.881 (0.395) 
Intercept of ln qia 0.492 0.493 0.996 (0.487) 
Price elasticity -0.051 0.083 -1.283 (0.547) 
- With F-value equal of 0.777 for the income test and 0.382 for the price test, neither of 
the hypothesis tests are significant. From the total sums of squares equal to 0.808 and 
0.037, the respective residual sums of squares are 0.759 and 0.036. 
As table 6.1 shows, the income elasticity is negative and small, and the size of the price 
elasticity, derived from the income-adjusted log quantity of enrollment, is also very small. For 
this regression, a total of five outliers have been removed because of preliminary testing 
showing that the inclusion of these data resulted in output signaling a very poor fit to the 
dependent variable. While this table shows a positive number for the price elasticity, this 
number is negative after being inserted into its relevant equation. In other words, ln qia is 
equal to the constant minus the price effect, so the correct value for the price elasticity is -
0.051, indicating that there is a small, negative price elasticity.  
A second way of estimating the price elasticity is by regressing ln p on ln qia, the opposite of 
what has been reported. By reversing the variables and changing which one is the dependent 
and explanatory variable, the inverse estimate of price elasticity can show whether there is a 
possibility of a bias when computed to a proper estimate by assuming that the coefficient of ln 
qia must be equal to 1. From the inverse estimate, the price elasticity in this case is -1.93, thus 
showing that there could be a presence of a significant bias of simultaneity in this estimate 
due to the great difference between the two estimates of the same variable.  
Table 6.1 also shows that both the income and price elasticity are insignificant or weakly 
significance. The income elasticity would show a possible contradiction of the predictions of 
hypothesis 1 when being negative rather than positive, as a positive (negative) percentage 
shift in income would lead to a negative (positive) shift in education spending, suggesting that 
education might be inferior. However, there is not enough evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of perfect inelasticity, and therefore this OLS estimation cannot prove that income 
does have an effect on the total education expenditures in Norway.  
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The same outcome is yielded when examining the price effect. This estimation already suffers 
both from the income effect being insignificant when assuming that the size of the dependent 
variable from equation 43 depends of the size of the income effect, and also because of the 
two different methods of estimating the price effect results in two different values of 
elasticity. In addition, neither of the two estimates are found to be significant, with the 
regression of price on the income-adjusted log enrollment having a standard error of 0.835 
and a t-value of 0.618. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
for the estimation of price elasticity for primary education no matter which one of the two 
methods of estimation being conducted. 
Table 6.2: Total Expenditures for Secondary Education 
Explanatory Variable: Coefficient Value: Standard Error: T-value: 
Intercept of ln pq 7.183 1.217 5.904*** (0.00) 
Income elasticity -0.427 0.154 -2.773** (0.013) 
Intercept of ln qia 0.142 0.538 0.264 (0.796) 
Price elasticity -0.033 0.082 0.405 (0.692) 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
- With F-value equal of 7.689 for the income test and 0.164 for the price test, only the 
income test is significant. From the total sums of squares equal to 0.503 and 0.037, 
the respective residual sums of squares are 0.759 and 0.036. 
The output for secondary education shows that the income elasticity has a negative sign, and 
the size of the elasticity is somewhat bigger than in the case of primary education. This OLS 
estimation does not exclude any of the Norwegian counties as outliers. Comparing 
furthermore to the primary education case, the evidence for inferiority of education is also 
stronger for secondary education, and the absolute t-value suggests that this is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Concerning the price effect, the elasticity is estimated to be -0.033, 
once again showing a small, negative effect.  
In this case, there is a statistically significant income effect, but the following estimation of 
price elasticity of secondary education is insignificant through its t-value. An additional test 
of a possible bias in this estimate is done by regressing ln p on ln qia, where the inverse 
estimate results in an estimate for the log price being -2.86, showing the possibility of a large 
bias due to simultaneity. Additionally, the difference between these and their respective 
significance shows that neither of these effects are sufficiently evident, as the latter estimation 
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with the price of secondary education being the dependent variable has a standard error of 
0.861 and a t-value of 0.405. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to conclude that there is 
a negative income effect or a small, negative price effect when analyzing the total expenditure 
on secondary education. 
Table 6.3: Total Education Expenditures for High Education 
Explanatory Variable: Coefficient Value: Standard Error: T-value: 
Intercept of ln pq 0.880 4.014 0.219 (0.830) 
Income elasticity 0.282 0.512 0.551 (0.592) 
- With F-value equal of 0.304 for this hypothesis test, this test is not significant. From 
the total sum of squares equal to 0.948, the residual sums of squares is 0.925 
 
This output is given from the demand analysis of total education expenditures for high 
education, aggregating the government and private components that will be separated in the 
next part of the analysis. This analysis does exclude some outliers, where preliminary analysis 
shows that these do have an impact on the outcome of this analysis. An important difference 
from the former analyses is that only the income effect is estimated here, to be compared to 
the outcome of a two-component time series analysis of high education following this 
analysis.  
However, this elasticity cannot be used for comparison as the OLS estimation of the income 
effect shows that the independent variable is not significant. This time, the income elasticity is 
positive (but small), but this is not relevant as the regression yields an insignificant estimate 
for the income elasticity. There is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis, and 
therefore this estimation does not prove that the coefficient value is an unbiased best estimate 
of the income elasticity.  
To summarize the analysis of the three levels of education, estimation of the income and price 
elasticities is conducted by first estimating the income effect by the use of cross-regional data 
from Norway, while this yielded estimate is plugged into equation 43 to estimate the price 
effect. For the first two levels of education, only the negative income elasticity from the 
secondary education is sufficiently significant. There could be various reasons for this specific 
part of the empirical model not being applicable for the Norwegian data. 
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From the output of the analyses conducted, there are many factors that suggest issues with the 
applicability of OLS estimation for this model. Various indicators show that the goodness-of-
fit for the estimated elasticities cannot possibly be the unbiased best estimates, even when the 
income elasticity of secondary education is not perfectly inelastic. Looking at the R-squared 
from the various tests, the ratio is between 0.012 and 0.31. Wooldridge (2009) explains that 
the R-squared ratio how much of the sample variation in the dependent variable that is 
explained by the explanatory variables. When the R-squared ratio is close to 1, the OLS 
estimation provides a perfect fit. The concern with this model is that the highest R-squared is 
0.31, which states that the OLS line fits 31% of the data. With most numbers around 10% or 
below, the OLS estimators show that the goodness-of-fit is very low, and the insignificance of 
most numbers are therefore, hence the resulting insignificance or weak significance in both 
the hypothesis tests and the estimated elasticities. This raises additional concern around the 
applicability of the negative income elasticity of secondary education. 
Why does this happen? One of the most obvious reasons, especially due to the many 
configurations of equations into single variable tests, is that most of these OLS estimations 
would suffer from the omitted variable bias. Even though the variables are put into context 
with a regression equation with at least two explanatory models, each of the estimations for 
obtaining values of elasticity is conducted with only one explanatory variable. The main 
problem with a simple regression analysis is that it violates the ceteris paribus, and it is not 
possible to state that a change in y happens because of a change in x when y also depends on 
other factors. This is a very bold statement claiming that one effect can explain a change in a 
dependent variable while being uncorrelated to all other variables absorbed in the residual (as 
income is assumed uncorrelated to price without being testable without quality-adjusted 
enrollment for each region).  
Conducting ANOVA-tests for all OLS regressions, there are reasons for more concern. As all 
of these tests show, the variance explained by the regression is quite low. The number of the 
residual is well above 50% for all of the ANOVA-tests, suggesting that most of the variance is 
explained in the tests’ estimated error term rather than explained by the regressions. While a 
lot of these tests also yield low F-statistics, the tendencies are very clear when comparing to 
the low values of R-squared. Since this evidence states that there is a violation of ceteris 
paribus because of an omitted variable bias (% 	≠ 0		67 	≠ 0	in a simple regression model 
with one explanatory variable), the estimated elasticities are not unbiased best estimates for 
the actual phenomenon. An omitted variable bias leads to a bias in the estimated elasticities, 
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and the sign and size of the omitted variable depends on the variable(s) that has (have) been 
omitted (Wooldridge, 2009, 91). There are signs of this in the price elasticities of primary and 
secondary education, but there is not sufficient evidence to determine this as all of these 
estimates are insignificant. 
Another important factor to determine whether or not the estimates from the regressions are 
unbiased best estimates is to test for multicollinearity. Under the Gauss-Markov theorems for 
unbiased estimates in time series analysis, none of the independent variables are allowed to 
perfectly correlate with each other. This does not mean that the explanatory variables are not 
allowed to correlate with each other, but additionally to perfect correlation they are not 
allowed to correlate strongly with each other. If they do, multicollinearity would be present in 
the estimation. This is not possible to test due to scarce cross-regional data about the quality-
adjusted enrollment for primary and secondary education that is available. Instead, correlation 
tests can be conducted in order to examine the correlation between independent and 
explanatory variables. Testing for heteroscedasticity shows that all of the variables are 
homoscedastic. Conducting a Breusch-Pagan test of heteroscedasticity yields BP-statistics 
between 0 and 1.03, and the p-values from the tests indicates that none of the two-step 
analyses exhibits heteroscedasticity. 
Correlation values shows that for the income effect, the total education expenditures for 
secondary education and the income per capita are correlated but opposite (-0.558), while the 
income has a low correlation with the expenditure for primary and high education (-0.247 and 
0.157 respectively). There are signs of an opposite linear relation between secondary 
education spending and income per capita, while there is no linear relationship between 
income per capita and education spending for primary and high education. The same 
phenomenon passes on to the estimation of price elasticity of education (where the time series 
analysis of high education is omitted). The estimated price elasticities are almost uncorrelated 
to their respective income-adjusted demand functions, at 0.163 and 0.108 respectively. For 
both effects, this shows strong signs for an omitted variable bias, which is a violation of a 
simple regression model being sufficient to yield best linear unbiased estimates for the 
Norwegian education spending and demand for education at all three levels of education. The 
conclusion is that there is not enough to confirm or reject hypothesis 1; it is not possible to 
prove that income and price have any effect on the education spending in Norway. 
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6.1.2. Two Component Time Series Analysis of High Education 
After the two-step analysis has been conducted for all three levels of education, the following 
time series analysis divides the demand for high education into two components: 
governmentally funded and privately funded education. High education is the only level being 
divided into two components because this level of education has the highest number of private 
schools and enrollment rate of all education levels in Norway. Nevertheless, the definition of 
a private school is not a unified definition as it consists of both private schools and 
independent schools. As stated in the methodology, private schools were forbidden in Norway 
until a change in legislation starting in 2005, but independent schools (a majority of these 
being religious) were permitted before this. Because of this, publicly available information 
about these private institutions have been very limited, and the limitation in detailed 
information about quality-adjusted enrollment and expenditures have therefore been estimated 
in years before 2005 and after 2009. 
The time series estimation has the ratio of total demand for high education in Norway divided 
by the population number each year as dependent variable. As of equation 43, the explanatory 
variables are the income and price elasticities for the government and private component 
aggregated into one time series analysis. The income for the government component is 
defined as the inflation-adjusted government revenue per capita, while the price effect is the 
ratio of government expenditure for high education over enrollment and CPI. For the non-
government component, the income is defined as real GDP per capita (more specifically the 
inflation-adjusted real GDP per capita), while the appropriate per-student price for private 
education is defined as the expenditure for private educational institutions over enrollment 
and CPI. Another important note about private educational institutions is that most of these 
are eligible to receive funds from the government, to be used for the operation of the facility 
only (capital transfers of these funds like dividends are prohibited by law). 
The time series analysis is not only chosen because of the availability of enrollment numbers, 
but also due to the lack of best linear unbiased estimates from cross-regional and time series 
analysis from the former analysis. This time series analysis examines if a pure time series 
analysis with the explanatory variables of two components will have any effect on the omitted 
variable bias. The following estimates are gathered from this analysis: 
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Table 6.4: Two Component Analysis of Expenditure for High Education 
 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
(coefficient values and 
standard error) 
Intercept ln yg ln pg Ln yn Ln pn 
-0.783 
(2.229) 
0.178** 
(0.064) 
-0.007 
(0.130) 
-0.453 
(0.276) 
0.021 
(0.046) 
Intercept Ln yg Ln pg Ln yn  
-0.45 
(2.040) 
0.183** 
(0.061) 
0 
(0.125) 
-0.510* 
(0.239) 
 
Intercept Ln yg  Ln yn Ln pn 
-0.715 
(1.790) 
0.181*** 
(0.028) 
 -0.459* 
(0.247) 
0.021 
(0.044) 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
The outcome from the table is based on three different configurations of the regression. The 
first row shows the estimates when all of the independent variables are included (the time 
series not exclude any outliers from any part of the analysis). The next two rows exclude one 
of the two price variables, as they both are insignificant. At least one of them is included in 
order to try to avoid a possible omitted variable bias by only including the income effects. 
Starting with the original outcome from the time series analysis, the elasticities from 
government component can be interpreted as an expected outcome from the relevant 
hypothesis. The income elasticity is small and positive, while the price elasticity of education 
is very small and negative. The non-government component yields a negative income effect 
and a positive price effect.  
Since both of the price effects are not significant (t-values of 0.056 and -0.464 for the 
government and non-government elasticity respectively), additional regressions are conducted 
in order to observe the eventual changes in the estimates when one of the insignificant effects 
are removed from the regression equation. As seen in table 5.4, including the price effect of 
education funded by the government could result in a perfectly inelastic demand for high 
education, ceteris paribus, but this estimate is strongly insignificant (t-value of 0.003) when 
the non-government price effect is omitted. Another regression is conducted, including the 
price effect for the non-government component. The small changes in each estimate of 
elasticity shows that the inclusion of the government price effect has no real effect on the 
estimates, which means that this variable should be a part of the residual. While the exclusion 
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of either price effect yields greater significance for the estimated income elasticities, the same 
change for the price effects are very small and is still insignificant (t-value of -0.481). There is 
not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis for any of the price effects, no matter which 
one of them are included or omitted. 
Configurations of equation 43 yield significant values for the government income effect, and 
this is also confirmed when the omission of any price variable leads to very small changes in 
the income elasticity. In the first regression and the second regression, the estimated 
government income elasticity is significant at the 5% level (t-value of 2.777 and 3.002), and 
omitting the non-government price effect leads to a change in the income elasticity estimate 
from 0.178 to 0.183. Omitting the government price effect yields an estimate that is 
significant at the 1% level, and the marginal change indicates that evidence can confirm a 
small and positive income elasticity that is slightly above 0.180 (t-value of 6.387). Ceteris 
paribus, a 1% change in government revenue per capita results in a 0.18% change in the 
demand for high education. 
Examining the change in the income effect for the non-government component sees the 
elasticity change from a non-significant value in the original regression (t-value of -1.641) to 
an estimate that is significant at the 10% level when at least one of the price variables are 
omitted (t-value of -2.129 when non-government price of education is omitted and -1.853 
when the government price is omitted). The sign of the estimate shows that a 1% change in 
the GDP per capita leads to a considerable opposite change (45-51%) in the demand for high 
education. The significance of this estimate shows that there is limited evidence that the 
demand for education is an inferior good if and only if the non-government income changes, 
ceteris paribus. 
When further testing the OLS estimators by omitting all price variables, the income elasticity 
for the government component remains at 0.183 and is significant at the 1% level (t-value of 
6.713), and the income elasticity for the non-government component is now also significant at 
the 1% level, the elasticity now being -0.51 (t-value of -2.349). Adding the results from the 
ANOVA-tests and the R-squared from each of the regressions conducted, the ANOVA states 
that a total sum of squares at 0.34 is explained by the regression sum of squares at 0.27 and 
the residual sum of squares at 0.08. Therefore, the majority of variation from the estimated 
model is explained by the regression, limiting the possibility of an omitted variable bias.  
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This is reflected in the R-squared, which is equal to 0.776  when omitting the non-government 
price effect and by omitting all price effects, while the R-squared is equal to 0.781 for the 
original regression and when the government price effect is omitted. The fit of the estimated 
elasticities is between 77.6% and 78.1% for the regressed OLS line. This leads to the 
goodness-of-fit being quite strong. However, testing the correlation for the entire equation 
shows that there could be multicollinearity as the government income effect and price effect 
correlates (correlation of 0.875). Assuming that this is false when the price variables are 
omitted, there is a strong correlation between the total demand for high education (0.825), but 
there is almost no correlation between the demand for high education and the non-government 
income. Testing for heteroscedasticity shows that all BP-statistics between 0.42 and 4.66 
(lowest p-value being 0.27) does not prove any heteroscedasticity being present in any of the 
configurations when estimating the demand for high education. 
Therefore, the evidence suggesting inferiority for the demand for education with respect to the 
private income effect, ceteris paribus, but this effect is uncertain both because of insufficient 
statistical evidence from the OLS regression and because the dependent variable is weakly 
correlated to the total demand for education. Hypothesis 2 can only be confirmed for the 
government income effect, while there are not enough evidence to confirm or reject this 
hypothesis with respect to any of the other explanatory variables. In other words, there is a 
small and positive income effect suggesting that an increase in the income level in Norway 
leads to an increase in demand for high education. However, this analysis is not able to 
sufficiently prove that there is a real effect between the demand for education and private 
income. There is no evidence that the price variables have any effect on the demand for high 
education.  
6.1.3. Aggregate Demand 
With the results from the former analyses in mind, the income effect and price effect will now 
be tested to examine if they can explain the aggregate demand for education. This is derived 
through the expression total aggregate education expenditure for all levels of education over 
real GDP, as shown in equation 44. This analysis is also divided into two parts, where the first 
part uses equation 44 to perform a two-step analysis, estimating the aggregate income 
elasticity by using cross-regional data and the price elasticity from time series data. The 
second part conducts a time series analysis based on equation 47, where the dependent 
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variable is the total aggregate expenditure over GDP, with income and price effect as 
explanatory variables. 
The outcome from the regressions is afterwards plotted, which will clearly show the 
goodness-of-fit for each of the methods used compared to the real numbers. While the time 
series analysis of the total expenditure over GDP yields a prediction of the real ratio, the 
estimates obtained from the two-step analysis provides fitted values that will be inserted into 
equation 44. The two-step analysis will also be split in two, where the estimated income 
elasticity remains constant for both of these additional parts, while the price elasticity is 
estimated first by regressing ln qia on ln p, and finally ln p is regressed on ln qia to obtain an 
inverse estimate that through rearrangement can yield an estimate that will determine whether 
there is a possible bias in the price elasticity. The following table shows the outcome of the 
two-step and time series analysis: 
Table 6.5: Aggregate Demand Analysis, Two-step and Time Series 
Estimation: Constant: Income Elasticity: Constant (two-step 
time series) 
Price Elasticity: 
Two-step 2.273 
(1.650) 
0.369* 
(0.209) 
-7.154*** 
(0.389) 
-0.424*** 
(0.059) 
“” 2.273 
(1.650) 
0.369* 
(0.209) 
14.67*** 
(1.132) 
-0.54*** 
(0.259) 
Time Series -4.188** 
(1.792) 
0.238*** 
(0.225) 
- -0.121*** 
(0.053) 
*Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level 
The conducted analysis on aggregate demand shows some important differences from the 
former analyses. Even if some of the analyses have shown signs of consistency with the 
predicted effects, the aggregate demand analysis yields estimated elasticities that are 
consistent with the predictions in hypothesis 4, no matter the use of the two-step method or 
the time series.  
 Figure 6.1: Aggregate Demand 
The two-step method, yields positive income elasticity, while the price elasticity is estimated 
to be negative. If the two-step
income and price effect, there could be more considerable changes in the education spe
when any of the effects changes. The income effect is significant at the 10% level, meaning 
that there is some evidence for this income elasticity being applicable. Comparing the two 
different estimated price effects shows that the small difference b
in a smaller chance for a bias being present in this estimate, and the estimated price elasticity 
is strongly significant. To compute the fitted values when comparing to the real numbers, the 
appropriate estimate of price elast
hence b = -0.454. 
Estimating the ratio of total education 
that are consistent with hypothesis
elasticity is negative. Both estimates are significant at the 1% level, suggesting that there is 
strong evidence to confirm the hypothesis. Further tests are, however, necessary in order to 
confirm that both tests exhibit
conducted, the lacking goodness
is 0.155 for the cross-regional regression and 0.785 for both of the price elasticity estimations. 
While the goodness-of-fit seems to be stronger for the price estimation, the use of the 
insignificant income elasticity used in the estimation of the price elasticity means that its 
goodness-of-fit cannot be considered true. Due to the lack of an aggregate quality
enrollment in the cross-regional data, it is not possible to test for multicollinearity
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correlation at all, but a correlation test between the total education spending and the real GDP 
per capita shows that there is a low correlation between them (0.394).  
Just like the figure shows, there is a much stronger goodness-of-fit between the predicted 
model from the time series of the spending to GDP ratio. To confirm this, the hypothesis test 
based on this estimation reveals and R-squared at 0.972, so the hypothesis test finds a very 
strong goodness-of-fit to the actual ratio. While the former two-step analysis suggests that 
there could be an omitted variable bias as the value of the residual sum of squares is estimated 
to be quite high, this time series prediction of the ratio directly suggests that the chance for an 
omitted variable bias is very low (residual sum of squares at 0.010 of total sum of squares 
equal to 0.347). Checking for multicollinearity reveals that the aggregate income and price 
effect is almost perfectly uncorrelated with each other (0.08), but it also reveals a strong 
correlation between the dependent variable and the price effect plus a weak and negative 
correlation between the dependent variable and the income elasticity. Once again this 
provides some evidence that the education expenditure is not very dependent on income in 
Norway, but the evidence from this time series regression is strong and robust enough to 
confirm hypothesis 4. Breusch-Pagan tests shows that there are some signs of 
heteroscedasticity for the two-step time series analysis (p-value of 0.17), but this is not 
sufficient to reject homoscedasticity. 
The analysis shows that the two-step analysis cannot tell us whether income and price have 
any effect on the education spending in Norway. The time series analysis shows that income 
has a small and positive effect while the price has a small and negative effect on the education 
spending. This is consistent with hypothesis 6 and shows that education in Norway is a 
normal good. Education spending in Norway increases relative to real GDP increases by 
23.8% when there is a 1% increase in income, and the same spending to GDP ratio decreases
12.1% when there is a 1% increase in the aggregate price of education. 
6.1.4. Aggregate Demand: Two-step, Two Component Analysis 
Further analysis of the aggregate demand sees to divide to the education spending into two 
different components. Splitting aggregate demand into a government and a private component 
makes it possible to examine the impact of the elasticities on their respective income and price 
effects. The analysis is divided in two, by using two different methods for both the 
government and the private component. The first method is OLS estimation through the two-
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step analysis from equation 42, while the second method is OLS estimation through time 
series analysis with the ratio of total education spending over GDP, from equation 44, for 
each component. 
When conducting the time series analysis, it is important to note that the spending over GDP 
ratio is the independent variable for both the government and private component, therefore the 
estimated income and price effects has been estimated from the reconfigured equation 47. The 
ln GDP is subtracted from both sides of the equation, hence the outcome yielded in table 6.6: 
Table 6.6: Two-Component Aggregate Demand, two-step and time series analysis 
Estimation: Constant: Income Elasticity Price Elasticity 
Two-step, crossreggov -4.069 
(4.886) 
0.762 
(0.832) 
- 
Two-step, timeseriesgov -0.995*** 
(0.117) 
- 0.062*** 
(0.017) 
Totexptogdp, gov 9.694*** 
(1.146) 
0.282* 
(0.15) 
-0.087*** 
(0.31) 
Two-step, crossregpriv 0.859 
(1.646) 
0.291 
(0.208) 
- 
Two-step, timeseriespriv -2.783*** 
(0.459) 
- -0.331*** 
(0.066) 
Totexptogdp, priv 0.145 
(4.426) 
-0.884** 
(0.565) 
-0.372*** 
(0.058) 
* Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
Starting by looking at the government component, there is a considerable positive elasticity 
on the income effect when using the two-step method. Inserting this estimate into ln qia leads 
to a very small and positive price effect. From the OLS regression, there seems to be signs of 
strong evidence for this price elasticity, but the robustness of this evidence is also 
questionable as the dependent variable is uncertain. Since the estimated income elasticity is 
insignificant, there is no evidence of ln qia being correct as there are no valid evidences that 
the size of the price effect is correct when including its estimated elasticity.  
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The listed estimate from time series analysis of the education spending to GDP ratio has been 
transformed from equation 47 to equation 48+, meaning that the reported price elasticity is (1-
b). This shows that there is some evidence for the estimated income elasticity, while the price 
elasticity is strongly significant. The time series analysis indicated that the income effect is a 
lot smaller than the estimated effect under the two-step analysis, while the price elasticity is 
very small and negative. This part of the analysis seems to point toward the expectance from 
hypothesis 6, while the two-step analysis has one insignificant effect leading to a very small 
and positive effect contradicting the expectance in hypothesis 5. The aggregate demand from 
the government component is plotted to illustrate the goodness-of-fit with the actual education 
expenditures to GDP ratio: 
Figure 6.2: Aggregate Demand for the Government Component 
With insufficient proof for the income elasticity being the best linear unbiased estimate for 
this effect, there is an unquestionable difference in both of the predictions compared to the 
actual number. Further proof of this is reflected in the outcome from the various hypothesis 
tests conducted. The regression of the two-step analysis has an R-squared at 0.047 in the 
cross-regional analysis and 0.103 in the time series component from the same analysis, so the 
hypothesis testing shows that an extremely small part of the variance in the model is 
explained by the two effects. The suspicion about an omitted variable bias is further enhanced 
as ANOVA-tests for both of the two-step regressions suggests a high degree of the total sum 
of squared residuals being explained by the variance from residuals rather than the regression. 
For the sake of the government component in hypothesis 5, there is not enough evidence to 
confirm this hypothesis. While testing for heteroscedasticity shows that only the time series 
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shows sign of heteroscedasticity, all of the government models exhibit homoscedasticity. 
However, with low or no significance in the income effects, the use of the reconfigured 
equation 48 to determine the price elasticity makes it impossible to conclude that the evidence 
shows a true price elasticity estimate. 
Comparing this to the time series analysis of the education spending to GDP ratio from 
equation 47, the R-squared and the ANOVA-test suggests a much stronger fit to the actual
model, with an R-squared equal to 0.925, and a total sum of squared residuals at 0.506 only 
being explained by a residual sum of squares at 0.038. Transforming this time series analysis 
into equation 48 does not show the same effect, as it cannot be used to explain the actual ratio.
Because of the reconfigured equation being constructed to also be dependent of the 
government income effect through subtraction of this, using an estimated income elasticity 
that has not be proven to be a best estimate might lead to a weakness when predicting an 
actual phenomenon. While reconfiguring the dependent variable, the real GDP is now 
included in the right hand side of the equation, but is constant while the price effect is variable 
with respect to its elasticity. Therefore, the government component of hypothesis 6 cannot be 
fully confirmed as there is strong evidence for the price elasticity being a best linear unbiased 
estimate, but there is only limited proof due to the income elasticity leading to a poor 
goodness-of-fit when plugged into the reconfigured expenditure to GDP ratio for the 
government component.  
For the private component, the outcome of the two-step analysis is similar to the outcome 
from the government component. There is a small and positive income effect from the use of 
cross-regional data, while there is negative price elasticity from the time series part. In 
general, the strength of the evidence is also very similar as the income elasticity is 
insignificant, while the price elasticity is significant all the way to the 1% level. However, this 
proof is as questionable as from the two-step analysis of the government component when 
using an insignificant estimate to obtain a significant estimate of a different effect. 
Nevertheless, figure 2 shows that there is a very poor goodness-of-fit, meaning that the two-
step analysis cannot be used to explain the aggregate education expenditure to GDP ratio for 
private education. As a sum of this, there is not enough evidence to conclude that hypothesis 6 
is true. It is therefore not possible to reject the chance of both income and price being 
perfectly inelastic. 
The time series analysis of the aggregate private education expenditures over GDP seems to 
exhibit some strong, but opposite results of what has been predicted in hypothesis 6. First, the 
77 
income elasticity is negative and quite large compared to any other of the elasticities 
estimated so far, but the price elasticity is also negative and more modest in size. To be able 
to possibly confirm this, this prediction must be consisted with the real values, all plotted in 
the figure below: 
Figure 6.3: Aggregate Demand for the Private Component 
Figure 6.3 suggests a strong goodness-of-fit between the predicted model and the actual ratio 
computed. Examining this closer reveals that there is a very high R-squared value for this 
OLS estimation, suggesting that the predicted model fits the real ratio at 97.7%, and the 
residual is also assumed very small as the ANOVA test predicts that the residual only explains 
0.059 of a total sum of squares of 2.577, also suggesting that there is a very low chance for an 
omitted variable bias. To confirm that these estimated are the best linear unbiased estimates, 
the estimated variables must also be tested for possible heteroscedasticity and 
multicollinearity. The Breusch-Pagan test reveals that both of the two-step analyses and the 
time series analysis of the spending to GDP ratio is homoscedastic. 
A correlation test of all three variables involved in this part reveals that there is no 
multicollinearity between the income effect and price effect. However, the test reveals that 
there is an almost perfect correlation between the education spending to GDP ratio, but this 
dependent variable is hardly correlated with the income effect. Considering that the income 
elasticity suggests that income is inferior with a substantial change to education spending 
when the GDP per capita increases (holding the price effect constant) this proof might be 
considered true, but the low impact it has on the education spending must be taken into 
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consideration. Additionally, further testing must be conducted over a long time period in order 
to prove that there is indeed inferiority when holding the price effect constant. In regards of 
hypothesis 6, the evidence can is sufficient to reject this hypothesis concerning the income 
effect, while it can be confirmed for the private education price effect. It is not possible to 
collectively confirm or reject the hypothesis. However, the strong evidence for the price 
effects for both components confirms hypothesis 6 with respect to the price effect, which is 
also a confirmation that the demand for private education is more sensitive to a change in 
price than the demand for education funded by the government. Examining the results, the 
negative impact on the income effect followed by a smaller negative impact in the price effect 
suggests that the education spending to GDP ratio will decrease as income increases, and the 
same happens with an increase in price. Following this ratio closely over time will tell if this 
is true. 
To summarize the two component aggregate demand analyses, none of the two-step analyses 
proves that the elasticities found are applicable as fitted numbers to the education spending to 
GDP ratio. This means that this research cannot prove the impact of income and price on the 
education spending in Norway. Evidence shows that there is a relationship between the 
dependent and the independent variables, but there are not sufficient evidence to claim that 
the income elasticity is true. This leads to a very poor fit to the real model, and the conclusion 
is that it is not possible to prove the impact that the income has on the education spending to 
GDP ratio, while the evidence suggests that the price of public education has a small and 
negative effect on the same ratio. The private education component shows that both income 
and price has a negative effect on the demand for private education. This evidence suggests 
that private education in Norway is an inferior good, but not a Giffen good. 
6.2. Testing for Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
After looking at the various results from the regression analyses, this section will examine if 
the different results depend on variation across time and across components like region and 
source of funding. From the methodology part 4.1.1, Torres-Reyna (2007) gives a general 
explanation that fixed effects when the tester is only interested in analyzing the impact of 
some variables that vary over time. Fixed effects testing through equation 46 removes time-
invariant characteristics to assess the net effect of the explanatory variables on the outcome 
variable. For random effects, variation across entities is assumed to be random and 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. In addition to time-variant characteristics, 
regression with random effects can be conducted by using equation 49.  
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To reveal if there are fixed effects or random effects in the regression framework used for this 
thesis, various tests can be conducted to reveal if the regressions exhibit random or fixed 
effects. In general, the tests conducted with the results listed in table 6.7 will first conduct a 
fixed effects test on a regression from a relevant two-step or a time series analysis. Following 
this regression, an F-test will be conducted to determine if there is a significant probability of 
fixed effects being present in the regression. The null hypothesis will be that there is no fixed 
effect. To further control for the possibility of random effects, a pooling OLS regression will 
be added. The outcome from the pooling regression will be inserted into a Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange Multiplier test for random effects. Table 6.7 reveals the outcome from the F-test of 
fixed effects and the Breusch-Pagan of random effects with further explanation of the results 
below: 
Table 6.7: Fixed and Random Effects 
Entity for Hypothesis Testing: Fixed Effects F-test 
F 
Random Effects BP-test 
χ² 
Cross-regional Expenditure, All 63.811 (0.000)*** 228.345 (0.000)*** 
Time Series Expenditure, All 1902.912 (0.000)*** 211.760 (0.000)*** 
Time Series High Education 238.565 (0.000)*** 0.672 (0.413) 
Time Series Aggregate Demand 8793.943 (0.000)*** 36.309 (0.000)*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
The regressions used for these tests are not all the same as used above. The cross-regional and 
time series total expenditure pq are aggregated across all levels of education to check for 
random effects when using income and price as explanatory variables with the three levels of 
education as components for each region or year. The time series analysis of high education 
and the aggregate demand uses the government and private education as separate components 
for each year. All regressions uses the total education expenditure pq as the dependent 
variable for these estimations and tests. The income-adjusted log quantity of demand for 
education is not relevant as none of the two-step analyses are included for fixed and random 
effects testing. Instead of using the education spending to GDP ratio when the government 
component yields valid results for the total spending but not for the ratio, the total education 
expenditure is the dependent variable of choice. All of the estimations use income and price 
(for different levels of education and sources of funding) as explanatory variables. 
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The results from table 6.7 shows that only the time series analysis of high education exhibits 
no sign of random effects. The Breusch-Pagan test of the pooling regression shows that there 
are no significant differences across the government and private components, therefore OLS 
estimation can be used. (Torres-Reyna, 2010) With all of the other entities exhibiting possible 
presence of both fixed and random effects, a Hausman test must be conducted to determine 
what kind of estimation that is appropriate for each entity of analysis.  
 
Table 6.8: Hausman Test of Fixed and Random Effects 
Entity for Hausman Test Hausman χ² p-value 
Cross-regional Expenditure, All 0.041 0.980 
Time Series Expenditure, All 0.151 0.928 
Time Series Aggregate Demand 38.852 0.000*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
The Hausman Test reveals that only the time series analysis of aggregate demand has a 
significant Hausman test statistic. The null hypothesis is that the model of preference is the 
random effects model, while the alternative is the fixed effects model (Torres-Reyna, 2010). 
The comparison of the random and fixed effects output from the regression analyses shows 
that both the cross-regional and the time series analysis of the total education expenditures 
based on equation 40 should be estimated with a random effects regression like equation 49. 
With the time series analysis of the education spending from equation 42 being applicable of 
fixed effects regression, it is also possible to estimate the education spending to GDP ratio 
from equation 44 without having to account for random effects.  
The evidence provides a conclusion that fixed effects within the entities (year, source of 
funding) of the time series demand analysis for high education and for aggregate demand are 
high enough to use a regression method like OLS to explain the relationship between the 
education spending and the explanatory variables across all entities. The cross-regional and 
time series analysis, however, cannot yield best estimates through all entities when separating 
the levels of education. Both of these components must be estimated by some regression 
consistent with equation 49. 
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7. Discussion 
After analyzing the demand and education spending, both by separating each level and from 
an aggregate demand analysis, the various results vary greatly in the applicability for 
interpretation. Starting with the division of the three levels into separate two-step analyses, 
OLS estimation of each level revealed that there were possibilities of primary and secondary 
education being an inferior good, while the high education possibly could be confirmed as a 
normal good. However, insignificance in the estimates of secondary and high education are 
confirmed through testing of robustness, showing that all exhibit very low goodness-of-fit to 
the total education expenditures for each levels. Correlation tests also show that income is 
weakly correlated to the expenditure on all levels, which is a weakness for the significant 
income elasticity of primary education in addition to its low goodness-of-fit.  
This tendency seems to move on to the next step as the price elasticities of education 
estimated by the education expenditures subtracted by the estimated income effects through 
their respective elasticity yield insignificant price elasticities on all levels. While the 
estimation of price elasticity is omitted for high education, as a time series demand analysis is 
conducted in the next part, the estimates from the primary and secondary education is 
followed by low goodness-of-fit. In addition, there seems to be some omitted variable bias as 
all of the regressions have a very high number of its total sum of squares explained from the 
residual sum of squares. The addition of income being uncorrelated with the demand for 
education and the total education expenditures in Norway, and the fact that the variables are 
insignificant, explains that it is not possible to reject that the income and price of education is 
perfectly inelastic. Furthermore, these explanatory variables does not provide best estimated 
for the education spending and the quality-adjusted enrollment in Norway. 
Because of the lack of publicly available expenditure information for private education cross-
regionally in Norway, an analysis with the total demand for high education is conducted in 
accordance to the framework of Chow & Shen (2006). The time series analysis provides some 
evidence for the income elasticities being valid. The government income variable is 
statistically significant, while both of the price variables are insignificant. Additionally, both 
of the price variables are showing signs of multicollinearity as they both correlate strongly to 
one of the independent variables in the time series. This brings up the problem with the 
omitted variable bias with only one variable of two different components being explanatory, 
additionally with the non-government income being uncorrelated with the total demand for 
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education. Together with goodness-of-fit and the ANOVA-test indicating that there is a very 
small chance for an omitted variable bias, hypothesis 2 can be confirmed for the government 
income effect, but it is not possible to confirm this hypothesis altogether. If the model omits 
the price variables, the evidence for best estimates are the strongest, but this might lead to an 
omitted variable bias. 
Moving on to the aggregate demand analyses, the use of the two-step analysis yields an 
insignificant income elasticity α, but the negative price elasticity b is significant. The two 
different methods used to estimate the price elasticity shows that there might be some bias, 
but not a very large one due to the small difference in the price estimates. While the price 
elasticity b has a strong significance with a decent goodness-of-fit plus a strong correlation to 
the dependent variable, the use of this estimate is very uncertain as the dependent variable 
uses the insignificant income effect with very low goodness-of-fit. Using the time series 
analysis for the aggregate education spending to GDP ratio provides estimates that are 
strongly statistically significant and with a high goodness-of-fit, suggesting that hypothesis 6 
is true. As a supplement, the ANOVA-test suggests that the chance for an omitted variable 
bias is very small, so it is probable that income and the price of education can be used to 
explain the education spending to GDP ratio. Conducting a correlation test shows that the 
ratio correlates strongly to the price variable, while the correlation between the ratio and 
income is very small. As multicollinearity is not present, the estimates can confirm hypothesis 
6, even if the dependent variable shows a very low correlation to the dependent variable. 
Dividing the same aggregate analyses into two different components (government and 
private) also provides very similar results compared to the former analyses, where one model 
cannot reject perfect inelasticity, while the other can confirm the size and sign of both 
elasticities. The income elasticity α for both components (government and private) are 
insignificant, while the use of these elasticities in the dependent variable yields a strongly 
significant price elasticity b for both components. While the time series analysis for the 
education spending to GDP ratio yields an income effect with weak statistical significance 
and a strongly significant price effect, the constructed equation for the government time series 
analysis yields a weak goodness-of-fit when the right-hand side is subtracted by constant real 
GDP. The conclusion for the government component is that there is not enough evidence for 
the estimates of the government component to be able to explain the total education 
expenditure to GDP ratio. Reconfiguring the equation by including the weakly significant 
income elasticity in the dependent variable might show signs of a possible configuration error, 
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but what it does show is that the applicability of this equation relies strongly on sufficient 
statistical evidence for the income and price effect no matter what equation is being used. The 
two-step analysis sees an identical general result with an insignificant income effect resulting 
in a significant price effect. The time series analysis for the private component yields a 
predicted model that has a very strong goodness-of-fit together with strongly significant 
estimates, but the major concern is its dependence on an insignificant estimate. 
The prediction of aggregate private education suggests inferiority for private education due to 
the income effect, but this is questionable both due to the low dependency on the income 
variable and because of the chosen time series period. The estimates explain that private 
education shows signs of being an inferior good, but with a negative price effect this is under 
no circumstances a Giffen good. The main issue with this part of the analysis is that an 
estimated annual growth rate (and discount rate when estimating data for past years) does not 
necessarily capture the real variance if there is a greater variation in yearly growth of the 
expenditure. Further analysis of private education could reveal stronger evidence on this 
subject in the future, since the private education spending to GDP ratio has changed at a very 
small rate compared to the government component.  
The problem that sees to arise from all of the two-step analyses is that, assuming that income 
and price are uncorrelated, the simple regression models seems to suffer from omitted 
variable bias. It also violates the assumption of ceteris paribus, and this suspicion is further 
enhanced due to the income effects being very weakly correlated to the total education 
spending plus it could destroy the validity of estimated price elasticity when depending on an 
insignificant income elasticity. Seeing that this is the case for all two-step analyses throughout 
this research, evidence indicates that the education spending in Norway is weakly dependent 
on the population’s income level. Because of welfare policies heavily subsidizing public 
goods and services, the price elasticities found valid are small in accordance to the predictions 
in the hypotheses. The strongest elasticities are observed in the elasticities of private 
education, but the private education expenditures are very weakly related to the real GDP per 
capita.  
Judging from both the descriptive analysis and the regression analyses conducted, there are 
indications of the variables used in the different estimations not being sufficient as evidence 
to explain the entire demand for education through the education expenditures in Norway. 
There seems to be a lack of some important labor market determinants, for example 
employment rate (which can be examined aggregative and for different sectors with a 
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variation in demand for formal credentials), post-education career opportunities (which might 
be challenging to state as a measurable numeric independent variable) and returns to 
education among others. As this is a very general analysis with the determinants being price 
and income, a future analysis could also include several factors at a more detailed level. 
Examples of such determinants are returns to schooling through time, personal characteristics 
like household size, parents’ level of education etc. (Nerman & Owens, 2010), but this is not 
necessarily as relevant as other macroeconomic factors determining the chances of 
employment (but returns to schooling is important in this case) and the robustness of firms to 
avoid large downsizes and shutdowns in difficult economic periods. 
To interpret and summarize the actual results of all these OLS estimations, estimation based 
on the two-step analysis using cross-regional data for income effect and time series data for 
the price effect only cannot explain their impact on the demand for education. While some of 
the regressions seems to confirm the predictions made of a positive income effect and a 
negative price effect (all effects being of marginal size), it is not possible to reject that each of 
the elasticities from a two-step analysis of demand is perfectly inelastic. An important 
implication to this evidence is that the omission of the price variables increases the risk of 
omitted variable bias. 
The same tendency is observed in the two-component time series analysis for high education, 
where only the government income elasticity can be confirmed as small and positive. This 
means that a change in the government revenue in Norway leads to a positive increase in the 
demand for high education. A 1% increase in income leads to 23.8% change in the education 
spending to GDP ratio. Since the case of the two-step analysis is the same for aggregate 
demand, the time series does however indicate that the aggregate education expenditures in 
Norway does depend on income and the price of education. The only difference from the case 
of the statistically significant impact of the income effect mentioned above (ceteris paribus) is 
that a 1% increase in price  = 	  leads to a 12.1% decrease in the education expenditures. 
There is an opposite relationship between the cost of providing education and the demand for 
education, proving that education in Norway is a normal good. Both of these statistical 
evidences shows that the aggregate demand (measured by the education spending to GDP 
ratio) in Norway is downward-sloping. 
Further analysis reveals that it is not possible to prove that the government income does have 
a relationship to the ratio of education spending over real GDP. The evidence explains that the 
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impact of the price is indeed negative and small, but the results yielded cannot reject that the 
influence of income and price effect on the education spending to GDP ratio is perfectly 
inelastic. The private component of aggregate demand suggests that both income and price 
effects have a small and negative impact on the education spending to real GDP ratio. The 
interpretation is that a 1% increase in income I leads to a 88.4% decrease in the spending to 
GDP ratio and price of education leads to a 37.2% decrease in the spending to GDP ratio, so 
this means that the evidence suggests the private education being an inferior good, but not a 
Giffen good. 
While the inferiority suggested by some of the analyses, especially in the private component, 
it is impossible to rule out configuration errors (which could break the evidence of the 
government component of aggregate demand if the lack of fit to the actual numbers is actually 
not as bad in reality). What might seem to be a possible issue in the regressions of aggregate 
spending not divided into separate components is that a major part of the expenditures for all 
levels of education are expenditures for education funded by the government. When private 
education still is a very small fraction of the total education supply in Norway, it is reasonable 
to assume that education is not dependent on income unless there is a big shift in the overall 
economic situation in a country. In addition to the education expenditures having a very weak 
dependence on the individual income level, all models using private education will suffer 
from the lack of data concerning private education.  
Even if enrollment data is available both cross-regionally and for time series, the private 
education expenditures in this research relies heavily on estimated numbers rather than data 
collections. Statistically significant evidence for the income and price effect is not necessarily 
applicable as true evidence because of the uncertainty and the need of a time period with real 
data for all time periods to confirm the estimated missing numbers. Another interesting 
alternative for further analysis of this subject is to substitute real GDP per capita with 
government income per capita rather than real GDP per capita (except from the division into 
two components) to observe if the outcome yields stronger evidence for a country where 
sectors like education is heavily based on public funding. While the government component 
does not explain the spending to GDP ratio very well, there is a big risk of configuration error 
and of biases due to the dependent variable depending on an estimated income effect, which 
in this case seems to change a decent goodness-of-fit into failure of explaining the ratio after 
reconfiguration. Like Figure 5.5 – 5.8 from the statistical analysis shows, the variation in 
education expenditures cannot be entirely accounted for through the population’s income, the 
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government revenue or the price of income. The quality-adjusted enrollment seems to have 
leveled out in the most recent times, and the income measures seem to be a leading effect 
compared to the growth in education spending. 
This last conclusion for the use of this model on Norwegian data is absolutely not a 
suggestion that this way of constructing the model and analysis framework for this kind of 
problem is wrong or too simple, but conducting this research on the available data for Norway 
suggests that Chow & Shen’s model is more applicable for countries with greater variation in 
a population’s income level across regions and when the education sector receives less 
funding from the government, having to fund it through a substantial amount of per-student 
fees like tuitions. While there might still be a big risk of omitted variable bias in the two-step 
analysis when conducted elsewhere, it would be very interesting to see these models used as 
demand analysis for countries like the U.S., Canada, the U.K, and other countries where the 
differences in private income and the sum of the education price for an individual student is 
much higher than what is the case in Norway. The progress made and the empirical work 
conducted in this thesis is not an attempt to question the validity of the work made by Chow 
& Shen, but should be used as an encouragement to do more research around this subject in 
Norway. More explanatory variables should be included to create a better context to the total 
picture. 
What does this thesis tell then? While it is very evident that the Norwegian data cannot be 
used to estimate the impact on the demand and education spending when using a two-step 
analysis, the time series of high education reveals that the demand for high education does 
depend on the government revenue. While the public income effect   is rather inelastic, the 
estimated elasticity reveals that significant shifts in the economic situation leading to budget 
cuts, results in a decrease in the total demand for high education. Looking at figure 5.5, the 
decrease in the growth rate for the education expenditure is not very big, and the enrollment 
has been nearly constant for almost the entire time period. If a dramatic change were to 
happen to the enrollment rate of high education, there would have to be an equivalent 
dramatic drop in government revenue. 
The aggregate demand shows that education is a normal good. When the population income 
level increases (decreases), the education spending increases (decreases), while an increase 
(decrease) in the per student cost of education results in a decrease (increase) in the education 
expenditures. Splitting the demand into two components shows that the government 
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component cannot explain the public spending to GDP ratio. While there seem to be strong 
evidence of inferiority for the private education, basing this evidence on a high degree of self-
estimated data is not enough to claim that statistically significant evidence is significant in 
reality. Both price effects indicate that the education spending will decrease (increase) for 
both the government and for private actors if there are substantial increases (decreases) in the 
price of education (accruing to the source of education funding). However, it is not possible to 
explain whether there are important differences between the government and a private agent 
providing education in Norway based on this thesis.  
For policy implications, it is evident that small changes in income and price for education will 
result in a small change in education spending across all levels of education, and likewise 
with large changes. The price is evidently more sensitive to changes when private agents are 
providing education, but in total the price is almost inelastic with the significant income 
effects relatively more elastic compared to the price effect. High education seems to be the 
level that will be most impacted by a greater decrease in education spending and demand for 
education following a recession, as it is the income effect with the highest impact on the 
demand for its respective level of education. This is also a logical conclusion, as primary and 
to some degree secondary is regarded necessary and have the highest enrollment rates across 
regions and through time (bearing in mind that primary education is mandatory by law). 
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8. Conclusion 
Using an existing framework with income and price effects as independent variables, the 
model has a motive to try to explain the demand for education in Norway on the background 
of quality-adjusted enrollment and the education spending both funded by the public and by 
private agents. In accordance to the results and expectancies from theory and other studies 
conducted on similar subjects, the income effect is assumed to be positive, while the price 
effect is assumed to be negative for all demand and education spending estimations 
conducted. All income and price effects are assumed to be elastic to some degree, making 
perfectly inelastic effects a null hypothesis for all regressions. 
The analysis of the first hypothesis shows that the education spending of the two lower levels 
of education show signs of contradiction toward this hypothesis, while the spending for high 
education seems to confirm the hypothesis. However, the evidence found through OLS 
estimation is insufficient because the strength of the test statistics shows that it is not possible 
to reject perfect inelasticity for income and price elasticities at the primary and secondary 
level of schooling. Additional robustness tests with poor goodness-of-fit and signals of 
omitted variable bias reveals that it is not possible to tell the real impact of the explanatory 
variables on the demand for education in Norway. Hypothesis 1 is therefore rejected. 
The analysis of high education is divided into a government and a private component to 
analyze the demand for high education in terms of quality-adjusted enrollment through time 
series. This analysis confirms hypothesis 2 for the income effect of the government 
component, while there are weak evidence for the price effect contradicting this hypothesis in 
terms of the private income effect changing in the opposite direction of the demand for 
education. The hypothesis as a whole cannot be confirmed, as the removal of the insignificant 
price variables leads to a strong goodness-of-fit. In addition, this increases the chance of 
omitted variable bias as the model only depends on one variable divided into two different 
components. It is not possible to confirm this hypothesis, and this analysis fails to reject 
perfect inelasticity of demand for all variables but the government income effect. A 1% 
increase in government revenue results in an 18.3% increase in the demand for education. 
The analysis of aggregate demand uses both the two-step method and a time series analysis of 
the ratio of education spending over real GDP. The two different methods of OLS estimation 
yield different results both in impact through their respective elasticities and in size. The two-
step analysis yields positive income elasticity and a negative price elasticity, slightly bigger 
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than the elasticities yielded from the time series analysis of the spending ratio. The strength of 
this evidence is not strong enough to confirm hypothesis 4, and the evidence fails to reject that 
the income and price are perfectly inelastic. The time series analysis does show stronger 
evidence for the income and price effect having an impact on the education spending ratio, 
leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis. The sizes of these effects confirm the predictions 
from hypothesis 4, with a small positive income effect and a small, but negative income 
effect. A 1% increase (decrease) in the real GDP leads to a 23.8% increase (decrease) in the 
education spending, while a 1% increase (decrease) in the per student price of education leads 
to a 12.1% decrease (increase) in education spending. Hypothesis 3 is rejected, while 
hypothesis 4 is therefore confirmed. 
To analyze the aggregate demand for any eventual differences between the two components, 
these components are separated into their own two-step and time series analyses, with the 
dependent variable of the government component being reconfigured to reflect the education 
spending to GDP ratio properly for this component. The two-step, two component analysis 
yield results that are consistent with the former aggregate analysis, showing that hypothesis 5 
cannot be confirmed as the estimated effects does not yield sufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis, which is confirmed by poor goodness-of-fit and signs of possible omitted 
variable bias. Hypothesis 5 is therefore rejected. 
The government component behaves like predicted in hypothesis 6 with both effects being 
small. The income effect is positive and the price effect is negative as predicted, but further 
application of the estimates shows that it cannot be used to explain the rate of education 
spending relative to the real GDP. The private component shows signs of contradiction with a 
larger negative income effect close to unity, while the price effect is negative and smaller. All 
of the time series estimates are sufficient to reject being perfectly inelastic, but only the 
private education component can explain its respective education spending to real GDP ratio. 
A regular time series analysis could have confirmed the hypothesis for all but the private 
income effect. However, hypothesis 6 can only be confirmed for the private price effect, while 
the income effect contradicts the predictions. All in all, hypothesis 6 must be rejected. 
The discussion part does also question the legitimacy of the private income estimate due to a 
large degree of estimation with very scarce availability of data. As a summary to the entire 
regression analysis chapter, hypothesis 7 is confirmed for all the obtained best linear unbiased 
estimated except from the private income effect from the two component aggregate demand 
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analysis (which rejects this hypothesis because of the contradicting elasticity). Hypothesis 8 is 
confirmed, as all best linear unbiased estimated for the price effects are negative and small. 
Most of the results show that there is some impact on the demand for education with a strong 
correlation between the price effect and the education spending (but with a small price effect). 
A statistical analysis shows that especially the two-step analysis is suffering from an omitted 
variable bias when used on Norwegian data. This is observed through an increase in the total 
education spending (until the peak in the most recent time periods) that is greater than any of 
the cyclical changes in income and price. Testing for random effects does also indicate that 
there are some random effects that must be accounted for through regression analysis, limiting 
the validity from fixed effects estimation. Except from the private income effect under the 
aggregate private demand for education, all of the other estimated elasticities being found 
statistically significant are consistent with the predictions from their relevant hypothesis. The 
main result with applicable estimates is that income has a small and positive impact on the 
demand for education and the price effect having a small and negative impact on the same 
demand. 
Additionally, there seems to be an indication that the change in income over time is a leading 
or current indicator of the development in education spending. Following regulation in 
legislation, an increase in the number of education facilities and enrollment in the private 
sector indicates that the education spending is a lagging indicator. This assumption is made by 
comparing the impact on a macroeconomic factor to the GDP and government revenue, where 
figure 5.8 shows that the fluctuations in the income variables occurs ahead of similar 
fluctuations in the education expenditures from figure 5.5. However, looking at the total 
government spending in figure 5.9 shows that this cannot be concluded without more 
evidence. 
The answer to the first research question in this thesis finds that education in Norway in 
general can be regarded as a normal good, with a positive income effect and a negative price 
effect. Separating the analysis into two component suggests that education funded by the 
government is a normal good (but cannot explain the spending to GDP ratio), while the 
private education seems to be inferior. The private component needs more data and evidence 
to confirm that this actually is the case. With the rejection of hypothesis 6, and without a valid 
indication of the government component, it is not possible to answer research question 2. 
Referring to the discussion chapter, further analysis of this subject should be conducted by 
including more variables that takes employment and labor market factors into account. 
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9. Appendix 
 
 
9.1 Data for the estimation of the cross-regional income effect: 
County: 
Østfold 
Akershus 
Oslo 
Hedmark 
Oppland 
Buskerud 
Vestfold 
Telemark 
Aust-Agder 
Vest-Agder 
Rogaland 
Hordaland 
Sogn 
Møre  
Sør-Trøndelag 
Nord-Trøndelag 
Nordland 
Troms 
Finnmark 
Total pop: 
278352 
556254 
613285 
192791 
187147 
265164 
236424 
170023 
111495 
174324 
443115 
490570 
108201 
256628 
297950 
133390 
238320 
158650 
73787 
GDP per Capita: 
283611 
372482 
702893 
289819 
290805 
339927 
305860 
312455 
294621 
388773 
469338 
429256 
356981 
398239 
387767 
296893 
329666 
344228 
336902  
Total eduexpend: 
5299061205 
10863816121 
18402889413 
4113737396 
4005867681 
4769646564 
4317899774 
3686702384 
2398931792 
3948319770 
9200937563 
13956608560 
2737632628 
5521375969 
10798856485 
3236198698 
5796032543 
5615623892 
2026214885 
CPI 
131.4 
 
(For all 
regions 
in NO.) 
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 9.2 Data for the estimation of the cross-regional income effect: 
County: 
 
Østfold 
Akershus 
Oslo 
Hedmark 
Oppland 
Buskerud 
Vestfold 
Telemark 
Aust-Agder 
Vest-Agder 
Rogaland 
Hordaland 
Sogn 
Møre  
STrøndelag 
NTrøndelag 
Nordland 
Troms 
Finnmark 
EnrollP: 
 
34589 
76145 
59631 
25183 
22242 
32612 
20372 
14364 
22992 
59624 
62341 
14406 
33051 
35989 
17582 
29636 
29636 
19416 
9403 
EnrollS: 
 
11015 
22879 
16741 
7493 
7337 
10033 
9622 
6825 
4586 
7421 
18515 
19491 
4813 
10403 
11270 
5788 
10161 
6652 
3181 
EnrollH: 
 
13916 
27945 
31509 
9917 
9738 
13170 
12153 
9088 
6007 
10126 
24400 
27450 
6121 
13752 
17529 
7329 
13126 
8929 
4132 
 
ExpendP: 
 
3131169225 
6367016465 
5420100114 
2486846433 
2330983842 
3018110152 
2605553200 
2107931584 
1424923164 
2218222176 
5472827336 
5945835216 
1610158620 
3263422689 
3427160492 
1826189594 
3212720216 
2059338624 
1143583457 
ExpendS: 
 
1644891980 
3492799656 
2388656103 
1114890963 
1078883839 
1355327871 
1217346574 
971770800 
675508628 
967624190 
2435944490 
2674594002 
813474008 
1557953280 
1542209340 
973009104 
1719312327 
1107285268 
577631428 
ExpendH: 
 
523000000 
1004000000 
10594133196 
512000000 
596000000 
396208541 
495000000 
607000000 
298500000 
762473404 
1292165737 
5336179342 
314000000 
700000000 
5829486653 
437000000 
864000000 
2449000000 
305000000 
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9.3 Data for the estimation of time series analysis: 
Year: 
 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
Total pop 
 
4392714 
4417599 
4445329 
4478497 
4503436 
4524066 
4552252 
4577457 
4606363 
4640219 
4681134 
4737171 
4799252 
4858199 
4920305 
4985870 
GDP per 
cap 
273563 
282390 
287269 
293926 
297787 
300855 
302585 
315984 
328755 
342836 
359053 
360744 
350309 
352282 
354445 
362976 
Enrollprim 
 
486242 
556764 
567265 
578084 
588515 
597540 
607739 
614279 
615518 
620353 
619048 
618589 
616139 
615927 
615973 
614374 
Enrollsec 
 
212451 
214342 
222253 
213380 
207903 
204920 
209888 
218225 
217160 
224215 
235665 
238722 
235771 
243210 
244370 
241523 
Enrollhi 
 
185320 
183026 
187482 
190943 
189947 
197062 
212395 
213845 
213940 
214711 
215237 
212672 
219282 
224706 
229743 
238224 
CPI 
 
97.8 
100 
102.3 
105.5 
108.7 
110.1 
112.8 
113.3 
115.1 
117.7 
118.6 
123.1 
125.7 
128.8 
130.4 
131.4 
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9.4 Data for the estimation of time series analysis: 
Year: 
 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
Eduspendprim 
 
24372000000 
27052000000 
27504000000 
31591000000 
34536000000 
38017000000 
40875000000 
42249000000 
44146000000 
46576000000 
49269000000 
52530000000 
56364000000 
59393000000 
60658000000 
59072000000 
Eduspendsec 
 
11997000000 
12724000000 
12727000000 
13418000000 
14876000000 
15603000000 
17317000000 
17510000000 
18374000000 
19405000000 
20359000000 
22388000000 
24013000000 
24651000000 
25341000000 
28309000000 
Eduspendhi 
 
15121000000 
16797000000 
17690000000 
18385000000 
19544000000 
21436000000 
23133000000 
24714000000 
25392000000 
26827000000 
28425000000 
30236000000 
32408000000 
32778000000 
34134000000 
30904000000 
Eduspendtot 
 
51490000000 
56573000000 
57921000000 
63394000000 
68956000000 
75056000000 
81325000000 
84473000000 
87912000000 
92808000000 
98053000000 
105154000000 
112785000000 
116822000000 
120133000000 
118285000000 
Aggprivate 
Spend* 
2999158481 
3344061706 
3728628803 
4157421115 
4635524543 
5168609865 
5763000000 
6763000000 
7517000000 
8337000000 
9662000000 
11086000000 
11996000000 
13701000000 
14310000000 
15955650000 
 
* Private education spending in time series have been estimated for all but 5 years. Expenditure data are 
available for 2005-2009, and on the background of these numbers, an estimate of the average growth in 
the available expenditures have been computed for all numbers post 2009. Hence, this average rate is 
used to deflate all numbers pre-2005, assuming that the expenditures for private numbers are growing 
from the first period and until the last. The analysis framework and the discussion part argues around 
this way of estimating when data shows an almost constant demand for private education relative to the 
total education spending in Norway. 
** All numbers from the regression analysis in chapter 6 have been estimated by the use of table 9.1-9.4 
through the statistics software IBM SPSS v2.1 
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9.5 Breusch-Pagan Test of Heteroscedasticity: 
Model: BP-statistic: p-value: 
Two-step Analysis: 
IncomeP 
IncomeS 
IncomeH 
PriceP 
PriceS 
Time Series Analysis, high edu: 
All variables 
PPriv omitted 
PGov omitted 
All price omitted 
Aggregate Demand: 
Two-step Income 
Two-step Price 
Time Series Aggregate 
Two-Component Aggregate: 
Government: 
Two-step Gov Income 
Two-step Gov Price 
Time Series Gov 
Private: 
Two-step Priv Income 
Two-step Priv Price 
Time Series Priv 
 
1.026 
0.536 
0.094 
0.571 
0.003 
 
4.664 
1.814 
3.938 
0.416 
 
0.081 
1.905 
2.006 
 
0.020 
1.998 
2.008 
0.043 
1.403 
0.971 
 
0.31 
0.46 
0.76 
0.45 
0.98 
 
0.32 
0.61 
0.27 
0.81 
 
0.78 
0.17 
0.37 
 
0.89 
0.16 
0.37 
0.83 
0.24 
0.62 
^ None of the values in this BP test was found significant, therefore all models exhibit homoscedasticity. 
~ The BP test was conducted by the use of the regression software R. The test was obtained through the package 
“lmtest”, using the function “bptest” to test for heteroscedasticity. 
